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Abstract
Contract-based design is a promising methodology for taming the complexity of developing sophist-
icated systems. A formal contract distinguishes between assumptions, which are constraints that
the designer of a component puts on the environments in which the component can be used safely,
and guarantees, which are promises that the designer asks from the team that implements the
component. A theory of formal contracts can be formalized as an interface theory, which supports
the composition and refinement of both assumptions and guarantees.
Although there is a rich landscape of contract-based design methods that address functional and
extra-functional properties, we present the first interface theory that is designed for ensuring system-
wide security properties, thus paving the way for a science of safety and security co-engineering. Our
framework provides a refinement relation and a composition operation that support both incremental
design and independent implementability. We develop our theory for both stateless and stateful
interfaces. We illustrate the applicability of our framework with an example inspired from the
automotive domain. Finally, we provide three plausible trace semantics to stateful information-flow
interfaces and we show that only two correspond to temporal logics for specifying hyperproperties,
while the third defines a new class of hyperproperties that lies between the other two classes.
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1 Introduction
The rise of pervasive information and communication technologies seen in cyber-physical
systems, internet of things, and blockchain services has been accompanied by a tremendous
growth in the size and complexity of systems [30]. Subtle dependencies involving multiple
architectural layers and unforeseen environmental interactions can expose these systems to
© E. Bartocci and T. Ferrère and T. A. Henzinger and D. Nickovic and A. Oliveira da Costa;
licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Dagstuhl Publishing, Germany
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
06
46
5v
2 
 [c
s.F
L]
  1
8 F
eb
 20
20
XX:2 Information-Flow Interfaces
cyber-attacks. This problem is further exacerbated by the heterogeneous nature of their
constituent components, which are often developed independently by different teams or
providers. In such a scenario, defining and enforcing security requirements across components
at an early stage of the design process becomes a necessity. This engineering approach
is called security-by-design. Although in recent years there has been impressive progress
in the verification of security properties for individual system components, the science of
compositional security design [26] is still its infancy.
Security policies are usually enforced by restricting the flow of information in a system [32].
Information-flow policies define which information a user or a software/hardware component
is allowed to observe by interacting with another component. They cover both confidentiality
and integrity constraints. Confidentiality limits the availability of information, for example,
by forbidding confidential data to leak to public variables. Integrity, dually, concerns the
modification of information, by prohibiting untrusted agents to interfere with trusted data.
The goal of information-flow control is to ensure that a system as a whole satisfies the desired
policies. This task is challenging because it needs to account also for implicit flows and side-
channels from which an attacker can infer information by combining multiple observations.
From a formal-language perspective, such security vulnerabilities are not characterized by
properties of a single system execution, but rather by properties of sets of execution traces,
which are called hyperproperties [8]. Much recent work on formal methods for security has
focused on model checking various classes of hyperproperties [7, 9, 18].
In this paper, we present a contract-based design [4] approach for information-flow
properties. Contract-based design provides a formal framework for building complex systems
from individual components, mixing both top-down and bottom-up steps. A top-down step
decomposes and refines system-wide requirements; a bottom-up step assembles a system
by combining available components. A formal contract distinguishes between assumptions,
which are constraints that the designer of a component puts on the environments in which
the component can be used safely, and guarantees, which are promises that the designer
asks from the team that implements the component. A theory of formal contracts can be
formalized as an interface theory, which supports the composition and refinement of both
assumptions and guarantees [13, 14, 33]. While there is a rich landscape of interface theories
for functional and extra-functional properties [6, 16, 11], we present the first interface theory
that is designed for ensuring system-wide security properties, thus paving the way for a
science of safety and security co-engineering.
Our theory is based on information-flow assumptions as well as information-flow guaran-
tees. As an interface theory, our theory supports both incremental design and independent
implementability [15]. Incremental design allows the composition of different system parts,
each coming with their own assumptions and guarantees, without requiring additional know-
ledge of the overall design context. Independent implementability enables the separate
refinement of different system parts by different teams that, without gaining additional
information about each other’s design choices, can still be certain that their designs, once
combined, preserve the specified system-wide requirements. While in previous interface
theories, the environment of a component is held responsible for meeting assumptions, and
the implementation of the component for the guarantees, there are cases of information-flow
violations for which blame cannot be assigned uniquely to the implementation or the en-
vironment. In information-flow interfaces we therefore introduce, besides assumptions and
guarantees, a new, third type of constraint—called properties—whose enforcement is the
shared responsibility of the implementation and the environment.
We develop our framework for both stateless and stateful interfaces. Stateless information-
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flow interfaces are built from primitive information-flow constraints—assumptions, guarantees,
and properties—of the form “the value of a variable y is always independent of the value of
another variable x.” Stateful information-flow interfaces add a temporal dimension, e.g., “the
value of y is independent of x until the value of z is independent of x.” The temporal dimension
is introduced through a natural notion of state and state transition for interfaces, not through
logical operators. Besides proving that our calculus of information-flow interfaces satisfies
the principles of incremental design and independent implementability, we show that among
three plausible ways of giving a trace semantics to stateful information-flow interfaces, only
two correspond to temporal logics for specifying hyperproperties, namely HyperLTL [7] and
linear time epistemic logic [17, 5]. The third, and arguably most natural, trace interpretation
of stateful information-flow interfaces defines a new class of hyperproperties that lies between
the other two classes.
2 Motivating Example
We illustrate the main concepts of our information flow interface theory using an electronic
vehicle immobilizer (EVI) example. An EVI is a security device handling a transponder
key and used by car manufacturers to prevent hot wiring a car, thus prevent car theft. If
the transponder authentication fails, then the engine control unit blocks the car’s ignition.
The communication between the immobilizer and other components in the vehicle takes
place through the controller area network (CAN), a serial communication technology that
is commonly used in automobile architectures to connect electronic control units (ECUs).
This communication protocol does not include native support of security-related features.
Thus, it is the responsibility of the components that use the bus to enforce confidentiality
and integrity policies.
Immobilizer
ECU
key
Secret key
ecu
imm
can CAN Bus
deb
Figure 1 Immobilizer in its environment.
In this example, we model the communica-
tion of an automotive engine control with an
immobilizer through the CAN. The authentica-
tion follows a challenge-response protocol. The
communication session starts with the engine’s
ECU sending a freshly generated random number
encrypted with a secret key known to both of the
devices. The immobilizer replies to this challenge
with an appropriate response encrypted with the
same key. Figure 1 depicts a high-level overview of this model, which must enforce the
following security property: the secret key shall never leak to the environment via the CAN
bus. In the remainder of this section, we illustrate how we can use an interface theory for
information flow policies to implement the above specification in (1) a top-down, and (2) a
bottom-up design fashion.
Top-down design: In this section, we demonstrate stepwise refinement of a global spe-
cification, in which different engineering teams can independently implement subsystems,
without violating the overall specification. We illustrate various steps of this top-down design
process in Figure 2 (a). We start with the interface F that represents the overall (closed)
system with the global property stating that data from key is not allowed to flow to can or
deb. We assume that the secret key and the CAN bus are standard components provided
by third-party suppliers. Our goal is to design the remaining sub-system consisting of the
immobilizer and the ECU. This gives us a natural decomposition of F into three interfaces:
(1) Fkey specifying the secret key, (2) Fcan specifying the CAN bus, and (3) Fteam specifying
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Figure 2 Vehicle immobilizer system: (a) top-down design, (b) stateful interface, and (c) bottom-
up design.
the sub-system that we want to further develop. We note that the property from F becomes
an assumption in Fteam.
The proposed decomposition does not work because Fteam is not compatible with Fcan—
their composition would violate the assumption from Fteam by enabling the secret key to flow
to the CAN via the ECU or the immobilizer. These two interfaces can be made compatible
by strengthening guarantees of Fteam and forbidding the key to flow to the ECU and the
immobilizer, resulting in the interface F ′team. We further decompose F ′team into two interfaces:
(1) Fecu specifying the ECU component, and (2) Fimm specifying the immobilizer component.
We note that the composition of Fkey, Fcan, Fecu and Fimm refines of the original system-
level specification F . Finally, we implement the four interfaces that we derived from the
overall specification, resulting in components fkey, fecu, fimm and fcan. We note that the
implementation of fecu and fimm could be done independently, by two separate teams. The
ECU (immobilizer) component makes sure that the secret key does not flow to its output
port and works correctly in any environment that forbids other means of the secret key
flowing to the CAN bus.
This example illustrates a top-down design using stateless interfaces. Figure 2 (b) depicts
the overall specification of a vehicle immobilizer systems that has two modes, operation and
debug, between which it can switch. The interface is a finite state machine with every state
being labelled with a stateless interface. In this example, the operation mode is decorated
with the same F interface from the stateless example and the debug mode is decorated with
the interface F ′ that allows the secret key flowing to all ports, including can and deb.
Bottom-up design: The bottom-up design, illustrated in Figure 2 (c), is to a large extent
symmetric to the top-down approach. We start with the available secret key, ECU, immobilizer
and CAN components, specified by interfaces Fkey, Fecu, Fimm and Fcan. The main design
step consists in composing a set of interfaces and inferring new (global) properties of the
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composition. We first compose Fecu and Fimm to obtain Fteam. We then compose Fteam with
Fkey and Fcan to obtain F . In this process, we infer two global properties that were never
specified as local (component) guarantees—that the secret key can never flow neither to the
CAN nor to the debug port.
3 Stateless Interfaces
In this section, we introduce a stateless interface and component algebra for secure information
flow. We say that information flows from one variable to another when the value of the first
influences the second. We focus on structural information flow and consequently abstract
system components to (reflexive and transitive) flow relations. Proofs are in the appendix A.
I Definition 1. A flow relation in A×B is reflexive in A ∩B and transitive in A ∪B.
I Definition 2. A stateless information-flow component is a tuple (X,Y,M), where: (1) X
and Y are disjoint sets of input and output variables, respectively; and (2)M⊆ (X∪Y )×Y
is a flow relation, called flows.
An information-flow interface specifies forbidden flows in an open system. It consists of
three no-flow relations: an assumption A, a guarantee G and a property P. The relation A
characterizes flows that we assume not to be part of the environment, G describes all flows
that the system forbids and that are local to it, and P qualifies flows that are forbidden by
the interaction between the system and its environement.
I Definition 3. A no-flow relation in A×B is irreflexive in A ∩B.
I Definition 4. A stateless information-flow interface is a tuple (X,Y,A,G,P), where: (1)
X and Y are disjoint sets of input and output variables, respectively, with Z = X ∪Y the set
of all variables; (2) A ⊆ Z ×X is a no-flow relation, called assumption; (3) G ⊆ Z × Y is a
no-flow relation, called guarantee; and (4) P ⊆ Z × Y is a no-flow relation, called property.
An interface is said to be pure when P = ∅.
The distinction between the guarantee and the property is akin to the distinction between
open systems and closed systems. The property represents a requirement on the closed system
that is enforced by a guarantee on the open system and an assumption on its environment.
In what follows, F = (X,Y,A,G,P) and F ′ = (X,Y,A′,G′,P ′) refer to arbitrary interfaces,
and f = (X,Y,M) and fE = (Y,X, E) to arbitrary components.
3.1 Environment and Implementations
A component is an implementation of an interface or its environment. The implementation of
an interface shares its input/output signature, while the implementation of its environment
reverses it. We define admissible environments and implementations of a given interface
as components that do not include flows forbidden by either the interface assumptions or
guarantees, respectively.
I Definition 5. A component fE of the form fE = (Y,X, E) is called an environment of F .
An environment is admissible for F , denoted by fE |= F , iff E ⊆ A.
I Definition 6. A component f of the form f = (X,Y,M) implements the interface F ,
denoted by f |= F , iffM⊆ G.
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Figure 3 Example of an ill-formed interface G with an implementation g, admissible environment
gE , and a component h that does not implement it.
Note that the sets of implementations and admissible environments are mutually exclusive,
hence we can use the notation |= for both.
We note that the complement of a guarantee is not transitively closed and hence does not
define a flow relation (the same holds for the complement of an assumption). This prevents
some interfaces to have a maximal implementation, i.e. a component that implements all
allowed flows. Figure 3 shows an interface G and a component h that does not implement
it. Both flows from h (full arrows inside the box) are allowed to be implemented on
their own, but not together. Note that their transitive closure includes the only flow
forbidden by the interface—a flow from key to can. Thus, to evaluate possible flow paths
between implementations and environments we need to consider alternated paths between
the complement of the guarantees and the complement of the assumptions.
An interface property specifies flows forbidden in all closed systems that result from
an interface implementation interacting with any of its admissible environments. This
interaction may generate new flows, which are created by composing an arbitrary number
of flows from both the implementation and the environment. Hence, an interface should
specify assumptions and guarantees that ensure none of the flows forbidden by its properties
is created in this way. We say that an interface is well-formed when it satisfies this condition.
I Definition 7. Interface F is well-formed iff ((IdZ ∪ A) ◦ (G ◦ A)∗ ◦ G) ∩ P = ∅.
I Example 8. In Figure 3, we depict the interface G, which requires as its only property that
no flow is created from the input variable key to the output variable can. This requirement
is its only guarantee, as well. Additionally, the interface assumes that the environment does
not create information flows from the input variable key to both the input variables imm and
ecu. In the same figure, we depict components g and gE , together with their (transitively
closed) flows. We can see that all g flows are not forbidden by G’s guarantee, and that all gE
flows are not forbidden by G’s assumption. Hence, g implements interface G, and gE is an
admissible environment of G.
A flow from key to can can be created by combining flows from both g and gE . In particular,
the information can flow from key to deb through g, then from deb to ecu in gE , and finally
from ecu to can through g again. This violates the G property. The problem stems from the
fact that the assumptions and guarantees of G are too weak to assure that the property is
satisfied under any combination of its admissible environments and implementations. In fact,
for the same reason, G is not a well-formed interface. The aforementioned path can be used
to show that G does not satisfy the condition in Definition 7.
We show that our definitions capture the intended semantics for implementations and
environments. In particular, we prove that the interaction between any of implementation
and admissible environment of a given well-formed interface cannot create flows forbidden by
its property.
I Proposition 9. Let F be a well-formed interface. For all components f = (X,Y,M) and
fE = (Y,X, E): if f |= F and fE |= F , then (M∪ E)∗ ∩ P = ∅.
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We introduce below the auxiliary notion of derived properties, which are guarantees
that hold under any admissible environment. They are derived by checking for all pairs
(z, y) of no-flows in the guarantees that there is no alternated path using flows allowed by
assumptions and guarantees that create a flow from z to y.
I Definition 10. We denote by PA,G the set of derived properties from assumptions A and
guarantees G, defined as follows PA,G = G \ ((IdZ ∪ A) ◦ (G ◦ A)∗ ◦ G).
3.2 Composition
We now present how to compose components and interfaces. We introduce a compatibility
predicate that checks whether the composition of two interfaces is a well-formed interface.
We prove that these two notions support the incremental design of systems. We prove that
our composition is both commutative and distributive. The composition of two components
is obtained as the reflexive and transitive closure of union of individual component flows.
I Definition 11. We define the different type of variables between interfaces F and F ′,
as follows: YF,F ′ = Y ∪ Y ′; XF,F ′ = (X ∪X ′) \ YF,F ′ ; and ZF,F ′ = YF,F ′ ∪XF,F ′ . The same
definition applies to components f and f ′.
I Definition 12. The composition of two components f and f ′ is the component defined as
follows: f ⊗ f ′ = (Xf,f ′ , Yf,f ′ , (M∪M′)∗).
3.2.1 Composition of Interfaces and Incremental Design
In what follows, we present the interface composition. We first show how to compute each
set (A, G, P) of the composed interface.
The composition of two interfaces should not restrict their initial set of implementations.
Thus, all flows that can be implemented by each interface individually need to be considered
while evaluating the composite’s guarantees. The composition of two components preserves
their individual flows and possibly introduces new ones via shared variables.
We introduce below the notion of composite flows, as the set of all flows that can be
in the composition of any implementation of the interfaces being composed. We compute
them by considering all possible alternated paths between both interfaces. Then, given that
guarantees specify which flows cannot be implemented, we define composite guarantees as
the composite flows’ complement.
I Definition 13. F and F ′ composite flows are defined as follows:
GF,F ′ = (IdZ′ ∪ GF ) ◦ (GF ′ ◦ GF )∗ ◦ (IdY ∪ GF ′).
I Definition 14. F and F ′ composite guarantees are defined as GF,F ′=(ZF,F ′×YF,F ′)\GF,F ′ .
We denote them by GF⊗F ′ and GF,F ′ , interchangeably.
The assumptions of the composition of multiple interfaces is the weakest condition on the
environment that allows the interfaces being composed to work together. Additionally, it must
support incremental design. So, the admissibility of an environment must be independent
of the order in which the interfaces are composed. Naturally, all the assumptions of each
interface must be considered during composition. However, not all of them can be kept as
assumptions of the composite.
The composition of two interfaces may change the classification of some input variables
of the interfaces being composed to output variables of their composite (c.f. Definition 11).
This happens to variables that are common to both interfaces being composed, which we
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refer to as shared variables. Interface assumptions that point to shared variables cannot be
assumptions of the composite interface, because they no longer point to an input variable.
Our solution is to compute propagated assumptions between two interfaces. Given an
assumption pointing to a shared variable, we propagate it to all variables that can reach the
shared one. We define it below followed by an illustrative example.
I Definition 15. The set of assumptions propagated from F to F ′ is defined as follows:
AˆF→F ′ = {(z, z′) | ∃s ∈ X ∩ Y ′ s.t. (z, s) ∈ A and (z′, s) ∈ GF,F ′}.
The set with all propagated assumptions of F and F ′ is defined as AˆF,F ′ = AˆF→F ′ ∪ AˆF ′→F .
The composite assumptions include all pairs that point to input variables and are in the
union of the assumptions of the interfaces being composed with their propagated assumptions.
I Definition 16. We denote by AF,F ′ the composite assumptions of F and F ′, defined as
follows: AF,F ′ = (A ∪A′ ∪ AˆF,F ′) ∩ (ZF,F ′ ×XF,F ′).
I Example 17.
Fimm ⊗ FcanFcan
can
deb
ecu
imm
imm
can
debecu
key
Fimm
key
can
imm
Figure 4 Composion of Fimm and Fcan.
In Figure 4 we can see interface Fimm which has
only one assumption: key should not flow to can.
As can is a shared variable of the interfaces being
composed, we need to compute the propagated
assumptions that it generates.
In Fcan both ecu and imm can flow to can. So, they are allowed flows in the composite
interface, as well. Note that, by Definition 13, {(ecu, can), (imm, can), (deb, can)} ∈ GFimm,Fcan .
Hence, by AFimm = {(key, can)}, we have AˆFimm→Fcan = {(key, ecu), (key, imm), (key, deb)}.
From the derived assumptions only (key, ecu) points to an input variable. Besides, as
explained before, the only assumption of Fimm cannot be kept after composition. Hence
AFimm,Fcan = {(key, ecu)}.
The properties of the composition needs to preserve the individual properties of each
interface being composed. In addition, it adds all derived properties from the assumptions and
guarantees of the composite. This allows to infer global properties from local specification.
I Definition 18. We denote by PF,F ′ the composite properties of F and F ′, defined as
follows: PF,F ′ = P ∪ P ′ ∪ PAF,F ′ ,GF,F ′ .
Interfaces composition is defined using the concepts of composite assumptions, guarantees
and properties defined before.
I Definition 19. The composition of two interfaces F and F ′ is the interface defined as
follows: F ⊗ F ′ = (XF,F ′ , YF,F ′ ,AF,F ′ ,GF,F ′ ,PF,F ′).
We allow composition for any two arbitrary interfaces. However, not all compositions
result in well-formed interfaces. For this reason, we define the notions of two interfaces
being composable and compatible. Composability imposes the syntactic restriction that both
interface’s output variables are disjoint. Compatibility captures the semantic requirement
that whenever an interface F provides inputs to an other interface F ′, then F ′ needs to
include guarantees that imply the assumptions of F .
I Definition 20. F and F ′ are composable iff Y ∩ Y ′ = ∅.
I Definition 21. Two interfaces F and F ′ are compatible, denoted F ∼ F ′ iff they are
composable and ((A ∪A′) ∩ (ZF,F ′ × YF,F ′)) ⊆ GF,F ′ .
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I Example 22.
Fimm ⊗ Fcan
imm
can
debecu
key
Fecu
key
can
ecu
Figure 5 Compatibility.
In Figure 5 we have interface Fecu which has only one
guarantee: key does not flow to ecu. This interface is com-
patible with the composition of Fcan with Fimm, because
the only assumption of Fcan ⊗Fimm is a guarantee of Fecu.
We prove below that our compatibility relation is sufficient to guarantee that the result
of composing two interfaces is a well-formed interface.
I Theorem 23 (Composition preserves well-formedness). Commutativity Let F and F ′ be
well-formed interfaces. If F ∼ F ′, then F ⊗ F ′ is a well-formed interface.
The composition operator is both commutative and associative. In particular, it supports
incremental design of systems.
I Proposition 24. Let F and F ′ be interfaces: F ∼ F ′ iff F ′ ∼ F , and F ⊗ F ′ = F ′ ⊗ F .
I Theorem 25 (Incremental design). Let F , F ′ and F ′′ be interfaces. If F ∼ F ′ and
(F ⊗ F ′) ∼ F ′′, then F ′ ∼ F ′′ and F ∼ (F ′ ⊗ F ′′).
Proof sketch. (Full proof in appendix A) We proved first some properties of composite
assumptions and guarantees. In particular, we proved that composite assumptions are
associative.
Consider the case that (z, s) is an assumption of F and we need to prove (z, s) ∈ GF,F ′⊗F ′′ .
Assume towards a contradiction that (z, s) ∈ GF,F ′⊗F ′′ .
s
z′
z
z′
F ′′
s
s′
z
z′
s
F F ⊗ F ′
s′
∈ AˆF→F ′
Figure 6 Incremental design.
By composite flows being associative, (z, s) ∈ GF⊗F ′,F ′′ .
We depict this case in the Figure 6. By (z, s) being an as-
sumption of F and definition of propagated assumptions,
(z, s′)∈ AˆF→F ′ and, as a consequence, (z, s′)∈AF⊗F ′ .
Then, by (F ⊗ F ′)∼F ′′, (z, s′)∈GF⊗F ′,F ′′ . However, z
can flow to s′ when F ⊗ F ′ is composed with F ′, i.e.
(z, s′)∈GF⊗F ′,F . This contradicts our initial assump-
tion. J
I Corollary 26. If F ∼ F ′ and F ⊗ F ′ ∼ F ′, then (F ⊗ F ′)⊗ F ′′ = F ⊗ (F ′ ⊗ F ′).
Finally, we show that flows resulting from the composition of any components that
implement two given interfaces are allowed by the composition of these interfaces.
I Proposition 27. Let F and F ′ be interfaces, and f = (X,Y,M) and f ′ = (X ′, Y ′,M′) be
components. If f |= F and f ′ |= F ′, then f ⊗ f ′ |= F ⊗ F ′.
3.3 Refinement and Independent Implementability
We now define a refinement relation between interfaces. Intuitively, an interface F ′ refines F
iff F ′ admits more environments than F , while constraining its implementations.
I Definition 28. Interface F ′ refines F , written F ′  F , when A′ ⊆ A, G ⊆ G′ and P ⊆ P ′.
I Proposition 29. Let F and F ′ be interfaces s.t. F ′  F . Let f = (X,Y,M) and
fE = (Y,X, E) be components. (a) If f |= F ′, then f |= F ; and (b) if fE |= F , then fE |= F ′.
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Derived properties are helpful to simplify the concept of wellformedness of an interface.
In fact, an interface is well-formed iff all no-flows in its property are in the set of derived
properties from its assumptions and guarantees.
I Proposition 30. An interface F = (X,Y,A,G,P) is well-formed iff P ⊆ PA,G.
I Theorem 31 (Independent implementability). For all well-formed interfaces F ′1, F1 and F2,
if F ′1  F1 and F1 ∼ F2, then F ′1 ∼ F2 and F ′1 ⊗ F2  F1 ⊗ F2.
Proof sketch. (Full proof in appendix A) The challenging part is to prove that the refined
composite contains all properties of the abstracted one, i.e. PF1⊗F2 ⊆ PF ′1⊗F2 . We prove by
induction on n ∈ N that: if (z, y) /∈ (IdZF1,F2 ∪ AF1,F2) ◦ (GF1,F2 ◦ AF1,F2)n ◦ GF1,F2 , then
(z, y) /∈ (IdZF ′1,F2 ∪AF ′1,F2)◦ (GF ′1,F2 ◦AF ′1,F2)
n ◦GF ′1,F2 .We remark that for all (z, s) ∈ AF1,F2
s.t. there exists (s, y) ∈ GF1,F2 , then, by F ′1  F1, it follows that for all (z, s) ∈ AF ′1,F2 there
exists (s, y) ∈ GF ′1,F2 . Hence if (z, y) /∈ AF1,F2 ◦ GF1,F2 , then (z, y) /∈ AF ′1,F2 ◦ GF ′1,F2 as
well. J
3.4 Shared Refinement
The shared refinement between two interfaces is their most general refinement. It allows
to describe components that are meant to be used in different environments by providing
separate descriptions for each case. Implementation of the shared refined interface must be
able to work with both environments while guaranteeing the same properties.
In order to cope with both environments it may be necessary to allow the environment
to create flows that were assumed to not be there by one of the interfaces. This may be
problematic, because a property may need that no-flow to be satisfied. To overcome this,
we introduce propagated guarantees below. The idea is that for each no-flow assumption
(z, x) that cannot be in the shared refined interface and for which it is relevant for a no-flow
property (x, y) to hold, we add a no-flow guarantee (x, y) that prevents a flow from the sink
of that assumption to the sink of the property.
I Definition 32. Let F and F ′ be two interfaces. The propagated guarantees F and F ′
is defined as: GˆF→F ′ = {(x, y) | (z, x) ∈ A, (z, x) /∈ A′ and (z, y) ∈ P}. The set of all
propagated assumptions is defined as GˆF→F ′ = GˆF→F ′ ∪ GˆF ′→F .
I Definition 33. Let F and F ′ be two interfaces such that X = X ′ and Y = Y ′. The shared
refinement of F and F ′ is defined as: F u F ′ = (X,Y,A ∩A′,G ∪ G′ ∪ GˆF,F ′ ,P ∪ P ′).
In the following, we prove that if interfaces are well-formed then their shared refinement
is well-formed, as well. Additionally, we show that the shared refinement is the most abstract
well-formed interface that refine both of them.
I Theorem 34. Let F , F ′ and F ′ be well-formed interfaces. F uF ′ is a well-formed interface;
and if F ′′  F and F ′′  F ′, then F ′′  F u F ′.
Proof sketch. (Full proof in appendix A) The interesting step is to prove that the shared
refinement is well-formed. We assume towards a contradiction that it does not hold. Then, we
prove the following statement about alternated paths, for all n ∈ N: if (z, y) ∈ ((IdZ∪AFuF ′)◦
(GFuF ′ ◦ AFuF ′)n ◦ GFuF ′), then (z, y) ∈ ((IdZ ∪A) ◦ (G ◦A)n ◦ G). Note that, if (z, y) ∈ P ,
(z, s) ∈ A and (z, s) /∈ A′ then, by definition of propagated guarantees, (s, y) ∈ GˆF→F ′ .
Thus, by definition of shared refinement, it cannot be the case that (s, y) ∈ GFuF ′ , and so
(z, y) /∈ AFuF ′ ◦ GFuF ′ . J
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3.5 Discussion
Properties: Interface theories usually only support specification of assumptions and guaran-
tees, which are concerned with either input or output behavior, respectively. This approach
turned out to be not expressive enough for defining an algebra that is useful to reason
about structural flows properties and supports both incremental design and independent
implementability.
For instance, we would need to have assumptions or guarantees of an open system
asserting properties about no-flows in the closed system. Recall that flows are transitive.
Thus, for any two variables x and y there exists an interface that can create flows between
them, as long as x is a source of some flow and y is a sink of some other flow. Therefore,
incremental design could not be supported unless we required all (global) forbidden flows to
a given output variable to be in the interface to start with. This requirement compromises
independent implementability. Hence we decided to include (global) properties in our algebra.
Completing interfaces: There is no unique way to extend an ill-formed interface into a
well-formed one. Given an alternated path that witnesses a violation of a property, it is
sufficient to add one of its elements to the interface specification to remove this specific
violation. So, there are as many extensions to the ill-formed interface as the elements in that
path, and all of them are incomparable.
4 Stateful Interfaces
We extend our theory with stateful components and interfaces. These are transition systems in
which each state is a stateless component or interface, respectively. Proofs are in appendix B.
I Definition 35. A stateful information-flow component f is a tuple (X,Y,Q, qˆ, δ,M), where:
X and Y are disjoint sets of input and output variables respectively, with Z = X ∪Y the set
of all variables; Q is a set of states and qˆ ∈ Q is the initial state; δ : Q→ 2Q is a transition
relation; M : Q→ 2Z×Y is a state labeling. For each state q ∈ Q we require that M(q) is a
flow relation and we denote by f(q) = (X,Y,M(q)) the stateless component implied by the
labeling of q.
I Definition 36. A stateful information-flow interface F is a tuple (X,Y,Q, qˆ, δ,A,G,P),
where: X and Y are disjoint sets of input and output variables, respectively; Q is a set of
states and qˆ ∈ Q is the initial state; δ : Q→ 2Q is a transition relation; A : Q→ 2Z×X is
called assumption; G : Q→ 2Z×Y is called guarantee; and P : Q→ 2Z×Y is called property.
For each state q ∈ Q we require that A(q), G(q) and P(q) are no-flow relations and we denote
by F(q) = (X,Y,A(q),G(q),P(q)) the stateless interface implied by the assumption, guarantee
and property of q.
In what follows, F = (X,Y,Q, qˆ, δ,A,G,P) and F′ = (X ′, Y ′, Q′, qˆ′, δ′,A′,G′,P′) are
stateful interfaces, and f = (X,Y,Qf , qˆf , δf ,M) and fE = (Y,X,QE , qˆE , δE ,E) are stateful
components.
I Definition 37. A stateful interface F is well-formed iff F(qˆ) is a well-formed stateless
interface, and for all q ∈ Q reachable from qˆ the stateless interface F(q) is well-formed.
4.1 Implements
A stateful component f implements a stateful interface F if there exists a simulation relation
from f to F such that the stateless components in the relation implement the stateless
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interfaces they are related to. Admissible environments are defined analogously.
I Definition 38. A component f implements the interface F, denoted by f |= F, iff there
exists H ⊆ Qf × Q s.t. (qˆf , qˆ) ∈ H and for all (qf , q) ∈ H: (i) f(qf) |= F(q); and (ii) if
q′f ∈ δf(qf), then there exists a state q′ ∈ δ(q) s.t. (q′f , q′) ∈ H.
I Definition 39. A component fE is an admissible environment for the interface F, denoted
by fE |= F, iff there exists a relation H ⊆ Q × QE s.t. (qˆ, qˆE) ∈ H and for all (q, qE) ∈ H:
(i) f(qE) |= F(q); and (ii) if q′ ∈ δF(q), then there exists a state q′E ∈ δE(qE) s.t. (q′, q′E) ∈ H.
As for stateless interfaces, we want to prove that interface’s properties are satisfied after
we compose any of its implementations f with any of its admissible environments fE . We
prove this below for all sates q that are common to any pair of relations witnessing f |= F
and fE |= F.
I Proposition 40. Let F be a well-formed interface, and f |= F and fE |= F. For all H ⊆
Qf×Q and HE ⊆ Q×QE that witness them, respectively, then: (i) (M(qˆf)∪E(qˆE))∗∩P(qˆ) = ∅;
and (ii) for all q ∈ Q that are reachable from qˆ, if (qf , q) ∈ H and (q, qE) ∈ HE , then
(M(qf) ∪ E(qE))∗ ∩ P(q) = ∅.
4.2 Composition
Composition of two components is defined as their synchronous product. The composition of
two interfaces is defined as their synchronous product, as well. However, we only keep the
states that are defined by the composition of two comptible stateless interfaces. Recall that
we assume that the environment is helpful, so it will respect state’s assumptions.
I Definition 41. Let f and f ′ be two components. Their composition is defined as the
tuple: f ⊗ f ′ = (Xf,f′ , Yf,f′ , Qf,f′ , qˆf,f′ , δf,f′ ,Mf,f′), where: Qf,f′ = Q×Q′ with qˆf,f′ = (qˆ, qˆ′);
(q2, q′2) ∈ δf,f′(q1, q1) iff q2 ∈ δ(q1) and q′2 ∈ δ′(q′1); for all (q, q′) ∈ Qf,f′ : Mf,f′(q, q′) =
(M(q) ∪M′(q′))∗.
I Definition 42. Let F and F′ be two interfaces. Their composition is defined as the
tuple: F ⊗ F′ = (XF,F′ , YF,F′ , QF,F′ , qˆF,F′ , δF,F′ ,AF,F′ ,GF,F′ ,PF,F′), where: qˆF,F′ = (qˆ, qˆ′) and
QF,F′ = {(q, q′) | F(q) ∼ F′(q′)}; (q2, q′2) ∈ δF,F′(q1, q′1) iff q2 ∈ δ(q1) and q′2 ∈ δ′(q′1); for all
(q, q′) ∈ QF,F′ : FF,F′(q, q′) = F(q)⊗ F′(q′).
Two stateful interfaces are compatible if the stateless interfaces defined by their initial
states are compatible. Note that this implies that all of the states reachable from the initial
state are defined by the composition of two compatible stateless interfaces, as well.
IDefinition 43. Two interfaces F and F′ are compatible, denoted by F ∼ F′, iff F(qˆ) ∼ F′(qˆ′).
We prove below propositions related to the composition of stateful interfaces that follow
from results from the stateless interfaces.
I Proposition 44. For all interfaces F and F′: F ∼ F′ iff F′ ∼ F.
I Proposition 45 (Composition preserves well-formedness). For all well-formed interfaces F1
and F2: If F1 ∼ F2, then F1 ⊗ F2 is a well-formed interface.
I Proposition 46 (Incremental design). For all interfaces F, G and I, if F ∼ G and (F⊗G) ∼ I,
then G ∼ I and F ∼ (G⊗ I).
I Proposition 47. If f |= F and g |= G, then f ⊗ g |= F⊗G.
Proof. Let Hf and Hg be the witnesses for f |= F and g |= G. Then, the relation
H = {((qf , qg), (qF, qG)) | qF ∈ Hf(qf) and qG ∈ Hg(qg)} witnesses f ⊗ g |= F⊗G. J
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Figure 7 Refined interfaces with witness: (a){(qˆ1, qˆ′1), (q2, q′2)}; and (b) {(qˆ1, qˆ′1), (q2, q′2), (q3, q′2)}.
4.3 Refinement
Given an interface, we define transitions parameterized by no-flows on its input variables (i.e.
with fixed assumptions) or on its output variables (i.e. with fixed guarantees and properties).
I Definition 48. Let F be an interface. Input transitions from a given state q ∈ Q are
defined as δX(q) = {δX(q,A) | A ⊆ Z × X} with δX(q,A) = {q′ ∈ δ(q) | A(q′) = A}.
Output transitions from a given state q ∈ Q are defined as δY (q) = {δY (q,G,P) | G ⊆
Z × Y and P ⊆ Z × Y } with δY (q,G,P) = {q′ ∈ δ(q) | G(q′) = G and P(q′) = P}.
Interface FR refines FA, if all output steps of FR can be simulated by FA, while all input
steps of FA can be simulated by FR. This corresponds to alternating alternating refinement,
as introduced in [1].
I Definition 49. Interface FR refines FA, written FR  FA, iff there exists a relation
H ⊆ QR ×QA s.t. (qˆR, qˆA) ∈ H and for all (qR, qA) ∈ H: (i) FR(qR)  FA(qA); (ii) for all
set of states O ∈ δYR (qR), there exists O′ ∈ δYA (qA) s.t. for all set of states I ′ ∈ δXA (qA), there
exists I ∈ δXR (qR) s.t. (O ∩ I)× (O′ ∩ I ′) ⊆ H.
I Example 50. In Figure 7 we depict two examples of refined stateful interfaces.
In Figure 7(a) the stateless interface in each state only uses output ports and it only
specifies properties. The initial state of both stateful interfaces is the same, so they clearly
refine each other. As there are no assumptions and guarantees, then, by Definition 49, we
need to check that for all successors of the initial state in the refined interface qs, there exists
a successor of the initial state in the abstract interface q′s such that PA(q′s) ⊆ PR(qs). This
holds for the states (q2, q′2). Hence the relation {(qˆ1, qˆ′1), (q2, q′2)} witnesses the refinement.
Note that the refined interface is obtained by removing a nondeterministic choice on the
transition function.
The witness relation for the refinement depicted in Figure 7(b) is {(qˆ1, qˆ′1), (q2, q′2), (q3, q′2)}.
The initial states are the same, so the condition (i) in Definition 49 is trivially satisfied. The
refined interface has two distinct output transitions from the initial state qˆ1. It can either go
to state q2 by choosing the set of guarantees and proposition with only one element (x, y)
or it can transition to state q3 by committing to the set of no-flows {(x, y), (x′, y)} for the
guarantees and {(x, y)} as property. From the initial state of the abstract interface, there
exists only one input transition possible, to assume that x does not flow to x′ and y′ does
not flow to x. The following holds for both states accessible from the initial state in the
refined interface: AR(q2) ⊆ AA(q′2) and AR(q3) ⊆ AA(q′2). The refined interface specifies
an alternative transition from the initial state (represented by state q3) that allows more
environments while restricting the implementation and preserving the property.
I Theorem 51. Let F′  F. (a) If f |= F′, then f |= F. (b) If fE |= F, then fE |= F′.
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Proof. LetH ⊆ Q1×Q2 be the relation witnessingH ⊆ Q1×Q2. (a) LetH|= ⊆ Qf×Q1 be
the relation witnessing f |= F1. Then, H = H|= ◦H witnesses f |= F. (b) Let H|= ⊆ Q2×QE
be the relation witnessing fE |= F. Then, H = H ◦H|= witnesses fE |= F′. J
I Theorem 52 (Independent implementability). For all well-formed interfaces F′1, F1 and F2,
if F′1  F1 and F1 ∼ F2, then F′1 ∼ F2 and F′1 ⊗ F2  F1 ⊗ F2.
Proof. Let H ⊆ Q′1 ×Q1 be the relation that witnesses F′1  F1. Then, the relation H =
{((qF′1 , qF2), (qF1 , qF2)) | (qF′1 , qF1)∈H and F1(qF1) ∼ F2(qF2)}witnesses F′1⊗F2  F1⊗F2. J
4.4 Discussion
The composition operation on stateful information-flow interfaces can be generalized to
distinguish between compatible and incompatible transitions of interfaces when they are
composed. Usually this is done by labeling transitions with letters from an alphabet, so that
only transitions with the same letter can be synchronized. While necessary for practical
modeling, we omit this technical generalization to allow the reader to focus on the novelties
of our formalism, which are the information-flow constraints (environment assumptions,
implementation guarantees, and global properties) at each state of an interface.
5 Trace Semantics
In this section, we explore three set semantics for a particular stateful interface. For simplicity,
we restrict our attention to boolean variables. Trace properties T are defined as sets of
infinite traces over the set of propositional variables, that is, T ⊆ Zω. The set T = 2Zω
defines the set of all trace properties. A system’s implementation is characterized by a set of
its executions S represented as a set of traces. Thus, system properties are sets of sets of
traces, T ⊆ 2T. We denote the valuation of variable x at time t in pi as pi[t](x).
We introduce below a possible interpretation for no-flow pairs. There is a no-flow relation
between two variables in a given set of traces at time t, if this set is closed under all their
interleavings at t. This means that given two variables, for all pairs of traces there exists a
third trace that combines the value of the first variable in the first trace with the value of
the second variable in the second trace.
I Definition 53. A trace pi′′ interleaves the evaluation of variable x in trace pi with the
evaluation of y in pi′ at a given time t iff:
interleave(t, xpi, ypi′ , pi′′)
def= x 6= y ∧ pi[t](x) = pi′′[t](x) ∧ pi′[t](y) = pi′′′[t](y).
z
y
x x
y
z
Figure 8 Stateful interface FU .
An interface characterizes a set of implementations,
i.e. it defines a set of sets of traces. We introduce next
plausible set semantics for the stateful interface in Figure 8.
This interface specifies that x does not flow to y until x
does not flow to z and it stays in that state. Note that
this interface only uses closed stateless interfaces in its
states, i.e. we only have output variables.
To capture our intended interpretation for the interleave predicate, pi and pi′ need to be
universally quantified, while pi′′ needs to be existentially quantified.
The quantification over time admits different interpretations. We can, for instance, force
all traces in an implementation to be synchronous concerning the states in that interface.
Then, state transitions are satisfied at the same time in all traces. This is the strong no-flow
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interpretation over time. Alternatively, we can require that for any arbitrary observation of
the system (one of its traces) all valuations witnessing a no-flow requirement in a state need
to be from the same time. In this case, state transitions must be synchronous with respect
to individual traces in an implementation. This is the structure-aware no-flow interpretation
over time. Finally, we may only require that the witnesses are presented in some time. We
refer to this interpretation as unstructured no-flow.
I Definition 54. We define the until predicate over xpi, ypi′ and zpi′ as:
φU (t, xpi, ypi′ , zpi′ , pi′′)
def= 0 < t ∧ ∀t ≤ t′′interleave(t′′, xpi, zpi′ , pi′′) ∧
∀0 ≤ t′ < t interleave(t′, xpi, ypi′ , pi′′).
There are three plausible set semantics for FU , which differ in the position of ∃t:
Strong no-flow JFUKs = {T | ∃t ∀pi∈T ∀pi′∈T ∃pi′′∈T : φU (t, xpi, ypi′ , zpi′ , pi′′)};
Structure-aware no-flow JFUKa = {T | ∀pi∈T ∃t ∀pi′∈T ∃pi′′∈T : φU (t, xpi, ypi′ , zpi′ , pi′′)};
Unstructured no-flow JFUKu = {T | ∀pi∈T ∀pi′∈T ∃pi′′∈T ∃t : φU (t, xpi, ypi′ , zpi′ , pi′′)}.
Clearly, JFUKu ⊆ JFUKa ⊆ JFUKs. The other direction does not hold. Hence these set
semantics are not equivalent.
I Theorem 55. JFUKs 6⊆ JFUKa 6⊆ JFUKu.
Proof. Tu ∈ JFUKu but Tu /∈ JFUKa. And, Ta ∈ JFUKa but Ta /∈ JFUKs.
t=0 t=1 1 < t
x y z x y z x y z
pi1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
pi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
pi3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Table 1 Set of traces Tu.
t=0 t=1 1 < t
x y z x y z x y z
pi1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
pi2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
pi3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
pi4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2 Set of traces Ta.
J
Linear temporal logic [28] (LTL) cannot express the properties introduced in Defini-
tion 54 [8, 7]. LTL extended with knowledge (linear time epistemic logic [5]) can express the
strong no-flow interpretation of FU [5]. The unstructured no-flow semantics can be specified
in HyperLTL [7]. HyperLTL extends LTL by allowing quantification over traces, which occur
at the beginning of the formula. Epistemic temporal logic and HyperLTL have incomparable
expressive power [5]. To the best of our knowledge, there is no temporal formalism that
supports the structure-aware semantics.
6 Related Work
Interface theories belong to the broader area of contract-based design [4, 3, 2, 10, 29]. The
use of contracts to design systems was popularized by Bertrand Meyer [27], following the
earlier ideas introduced by Floyd and Hoare [19, 23]. Hoare logic allows to reason formally
about refinement and composition for sequential imperative programs. Other language-based
techniques have been proved useful to verify and enforce information flow policies [31].
Examples range from type systems [20] to program analysis using program-dependency
graphs (PDGs) [22, 21]. These techniques are tailored for specific implementation languages.
In our approach we are we aim at working with composition and refinement notions that are
independent of the language adopted for the implementations. Therefore, language oriented
techniques are not directly related to our work.
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Interface automata [12] (IA), is a stateful interface language designed to capture interfaces’
input/output (I/O) temporal aspect. IA allows the specification of input and output actions
through which a component can interact with the environment, while hidden actions represent
the internal transitions that cannot be observed by the environment. This formalism has
been later further enriched to include also extra functional requirements such as resource [6],
timing [16, 11] and security [25] requirements.
The work in [25] presents a variant of IA called Interface for structure and security (ISS)
that enables the specification of two different kind of actions: one type for actions related
to low confidential information that are accessible to all users and another type related to
high confidential information that are accessible to users with appropriate rights. In this
setting the authors present a bisimulation based notion of non-interference (BNNI) that
checks whether the system behaves in the same way when high actions are performed or
when they are considered hidden actions. In a recent paper [24], the same authors notice
ISS and BNNI may fail to detect an information leakage and they propose an alternative
refinement-based notion of non-interference. Our approach is orthogonal to IA and their
extensions: we do not characterise the type of actions of each component, but only their
input/output ports defining explicitly the information flow relations among them.
Closer to our approach is [13], which defines theories for both stateless and deterministic
stateful interfaces where the assumptions on the environment are satisfiable predicates over
input variables and the guarantees are predicates over output variables. These theories
support both stepwise-refinement and independent implementation of components and they
have proven to be very successful to reason compositionally about trace properties [4]. We are
not aware of extensions that provide explicit support for security policies such as information
flow. Interface theories require input and output ports to be disjoint, and so it cannot express
properties that relate them. On the contrary, our information flow interfaces, to ensure
compositionality, require a third relation (property) that specifies forbidden information flows
for which the component and the environment must share responsibility to enforce them.
Our approach took inspiration from the work on relational interfaces (RIs) in [33]. RIs
specify the legal inputs that the environment is allowed to provide to the component and
for each the legal input, what are the legal outputs that the component can generate when
provided with that input. A contract in RIs is expressed as first-order logic (FOL) formulas
that are evaluated over individual traces. Hence, RIs can only relate input and output values
in a trace, and not across multiple traces. Our formalism can instead specify information
flow requirements that are related to sets of systems’ executions.
Temporal logics [28], like LTL or CTL* are used to specify trace properties of reactive
systems. HyperLTL and HyperCTL* [7] extend temporal logics by introducing quantifiers
over path variables. They allow relating multiple executions and expressing for instance
information-flow security properties [8, 7]. Epistemic temporal logics [5] provide the knowledge
connective with an implicit quantification over traces. All these extensions reason about
closed systems while our approach allows compositional reasoning about open systems.
7 Conclusion
We propose a novel interface theory to specify information flow properties. Our framework
includes both stateless and stateful interfaces and supports both incremental design and
independent implementability. We also provide three plausible trace semantics for the class
of stateful interfaces with boolean variables. We show that, while two of these semantics
correspond to temporal logics for specifying hyperproperties, for the third (structure-aware
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no-flow), we are not aware of any temporal formalism supporting it.
As future work, we will explore how to extend our theory with sets of must-flows, i.e.
support for modal specifications. This will enable, for example, to specify flows that a state q
must implement so that the system can transition to a different state. Another direction is to
investigate the expressiveness of the structure-aware no-flow trace semantics, characterizing
further the class of hyperproperties that can be expressed in our formalism.
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A Stateless Interfaces: Proofs and Auxiliary Results
I Lemma 56. If F ∼ G and F ⊗G ∼ I, then their output variables are pairwise disjoint, in
particular, YF ∩ YG = ∅, YF ∩ YI = ∅, and YG ∩ YI = ∅.
Proof. Trivial. J
I Lemma 57. If F1 ∼ F2 and F1 ⊗ F2 ∼ F3, then: PAF1⊗F2 ,GF1⊗F2 ⊆ PAF1⊗F2,F3 ,GF1⊗F2,F3 .
Proof. Follows from AF1⊗F2,F3 ⊆ AF1⊗F2 and GF1⊗F2,F3 ⊆ GF1⊗F2 . J
From now on, F = (X,Y,A,G,P) is an interface, and f = (X,Y,M) and fE = (Y,X, E)
are components.
A.1 Proof for Theorem 9
Let F be a well-formed interface. For all components f = (X,Y,M) and fE = (Y,X, E): if
f |= F and fE |= F , then (M∪ E)∗ ∩ P = ∅.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary interface F . Assume that: (a1) F is a well-formed interface,
(a2) f |= F , and (a3) fE |= F .
(z, z′) ∈ (M∪ E)∗ denesting rule⇔
(z, z′) ∈ E∗ ◦ (M◦ E∗)∗ flows are closed for *⇔
(z, z′) ∈ (IdZ ∪ E) ◦ (M◦ E)∗ ◦ (IdY ∪M) (a2)⇒
(a3)
(z, z′) ∈ (IdZ ∪ A) ◦ (G ◦ A)∗ ◦ (IdY ∪ G)⇒
(z, z′) ∈ (IdZ ∪ A) ◦ (G ◦ A)∗ ◦ G or (z, z′) ∈ Z ×X (a1)⇒
(z, z′) /∈ P.
Hence, (M∪ E)∗ ∩ P = ∅. J
A.2 Properties of Composite Flows
Let F and F ′ be interfaces.
I Proposition 58. The definition of composite flows can be rewritten as follows:
GF,F ′ = G ∪ G′ ∪ (G ◦ G′)+ ∪ (G′ ◦ G)+ ∪ ((G′ ◦ G)+ ◦ G′) ∪ ((G ◦ G′)+ ◦ G).
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Proof.
GF,F ′ def. 13=
(IdZ′ ∪ G) ◦ (G′ ◦ G)∗ ◦ (IdY ∪ G′) =
G′ ∪ (G′ ◦ G)+ ∪ ((G′ ◦ G)+ ◦ G′) ∪ G ∪ (G ◦ (G′ ◦ G)+) ∪ (G ◦ (G′ ◦ G)∗ ◦ G′) =
G′ ∪ G ∪ (G′ ◦ G)+ ∪ (G ◦ G′)+ ∪ ((G′ ◦ G)+ ◦ G′) ∪ ((G ◦ G′)+ ◦ G). J
From the previous proposition we can derive that composite flows are commutative.
I Proposition 59. GF,F ′ = GF ′,F .
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 58. J
I Proposition 60. GF,F ′ is a reflexive relation in YF,F ′ .
Proof. By definition of interface G and G′ are reflexive relations. Moreover, we can derive
that IdYF,F ′ ⊆ G ∪ G
′. Then, by definition of composite flows, it follows that, G ∪ G′ ⊆ GF,F ′ ,
and so IdYF,F ′ ⊆ GF,F ′ . Hence GF,F ′ is a reflexive relation in YF,F ′ . J
In the lemma bellow we prove some properties of composite flows that are used in the
proofs of important results later. The first property tell us that, when the set of output ports
is disjoint, then the only way to flow to a given output variable is through the flows allowed
by that variable’s interface. This property is very important to prove results related to the
assumptions derived for the composition, which are defined later. The second property tell
us that considering more interfaces can only increase the possible flows. Finally, the third
property states that our operator always compute the same set of possible flows between
multiple interfaces independently of the order in which each interface is considered. This last
property tell us that the composition’s guarantee is associative.
I Lemma 61. Let F , F ′ and F ′′ be interfaces.
(a) Suffix: If (z, y) ∈ GF,F ′ and y ∈ Y \ Y ′, then
(z, y) ∈ G ∪ (GF,F ′ ◦ G) and
if (z, y) /∈ G, then for all (z, s) ∈ GF,F ′ and (s, y) ∈ G, we have s ∈ Y ′.
(b) Monotonicity: GF,F ′ ⊆ GF,F ′⊗F ′′ .
(c) Associativity: GF⊗F ′,F ′′ = GF,F ′⊗F ′′ .
Proof. Consider arbitrary interfaces F , F ′ and F ′′.
(a) Assume that (z, y) ∈ GF,F ′ with y ∈ Y \ Y ′.
(z, y) ∈ GF,F ′ prop. 58⇔
y∈Y \Y ′
(?)(z, y) ∈ G ∪ ((G′ ◦ (G ◦ G′)∗ ◦ G) ∪ (G ◦ G′)+ ◦ G) prop. 58⇒
(z, y) ∈ G ∪ (GF,F ′ ◦ G).
By (?), it follows that, if (z, y) /∈ G, then (z, y) = (z, s) ◦ (s, y) with (z, s) ∈ GF,F ′ ,
(s, y) ∈ G and s ∈ Y ′.
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(b)
(z, y) ∈ GF,F ′ def. 13⇔
(z, y) ∈ (IdZ′ ∪ G) ◦ (G′ ◦ G)∗ ◦ (IdY ∪ G′)
G′⊆GF ′⊗F ′′⇒
Z′⊆ZF ′,F ′′
(z, y) ∈ (IdZF ′,F ′′ ∪ G) ◦ (GF ′⊗F ′′ ◦ G)∗ ◦ (IdY ∪ GF ′⊗F ′′)
def. 13⇔
(z, y) ∈ GF,F ′⊗F ′′ .
(c) We start by proving that: GF⊗F ′,F ′′ ⊆ GF,F ′⊗F ′′ .
Consider an arbitrary (z, y) ∈ GF⊗F ′,F ′′ . We consider first the case that y ∈ Y ′′. Then,
by definition of composite flows, we can derive that what we want to prove is equivalent
to the following statement over (alternated) paths, for all n ∈ N, 0 ≤ i ≤ n/2 and
0 ≤ j ≤ m/2:
if (z, y) = pn ◦ . . . ◦ p1, with p2i ∈ GF⊗F ′ and p2i+1 ∈ G′′,
then there exists p′m, . . . , p′1 s.t. (z, y) = p′m ◦ . . . ◦ p′1, p′2j ∈ G, p′2j+1 ∈ GF ′⊗F ′′ , and
there exists 0 ≤ (kj + rj) ≤ n s.t. p′2j+1 = pkj+rj ◦ . . . ◦ pkj+0.
We proceed by induction on n.
Base Case (n = 1): Consider arbitrary (z, y) ∈ G′, then, by definition of composite
flows, (z, y) ∈ GF ′⊗F ′′ . So, m = 1, k1 = 1 and r1 = 0.
Inductive case: Assume as induction hypothesis that our property holds for paths of size
n. Assume that there exists pn+1, . . . , p1 such that for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n/2:
(?)(z, y) = pn+1 ◦ . . . ◦ p1, with p2i ∈ GF⊗F ′ and p2i+1 ∈ G′′.
By induction hypothesis we know that, 0 ≤ j ≤ mn/2:
there exists (s, y) = p′mn ◦ . . . ◦ p′1 s.t. (z, y) = pn+1 ◦ (s, y),
p′2j ∈ G, p′2j+1 ∈ GF ′⊗F ′′ and
there exists 0 ≤ (kj + rj) ≤ n s.t. p′2j+1 = pkj+rj ◦ . . . ◦ pkj+0.
Case n+ 1 is odd: Then, by (?), pn+1 ∈ G′′ and pn ∈ GF⊗F ′ .
If mn is even, then pm ∈ G. So, the property holds for n+ 1 with mn+1 = m+ 1
and pmn+1 = pn+1.
Otherwise, if mn is odd, then pmn ∈ GF ′⊗F ′′ with p′mn = pk+r ◦ . . . ◦ pk+0, for some
k and r. Additionally, we know that pk+r = pn.
Case pn ∈ G: It holds with mn+1 = m+ 1 and p′mn+1 = pn+1.
Case pn ∈ G′: It holds with mn+1 = m and p′mn+1 = pn+1 ◦ pk+r ◦ . . . ◦ pk+0.
Case n+ 1 is even: Then, pn+1 ∈ GF⊗F ′ . Follows from an analogous reasoning.
We can prove analogously that the property holds for arbitrary (z, y) ∈ GF⊗F ′,F ′′ with
y ∈ Y ∪ Y ′.
We prove analogously that GF⊗F ′,F ′′ ⊇ GF,F ′⊗F ′′ . J
A.3 Properties of Propagated Assumptions
Let F , F ′ and F ′′ be interfaces.
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I Proposition 62. If F ∼ F ′, then AˆF,F ′ is an irreflexive relation.
Proof. Consider two compatible interfaces F and F ′. Assume towards a contradiction that
there exists (z, z) ∈ AˆF→F ′ . By definition of propagated assumptions:
∃s ∈ X ∩ Y ′ s.t. (z, s) ∈ A and (z, s) ∈ GF,F ′ .
Then, by s ∈ Y ′, (z, s) ∈ A ∩ (ZF,F ′ × YF,F ′). So, by F ∼ F ′, it follows that (z, s) /∈ GF,F ′ .
We can prove analogously that (z, z) /∈ AˆF ′→F . J
I Lemma 63. Let F1, F ′1 and F2 be interfaces. If F ′1  F1, then AˆF ′1,F2 ⊆ AˆF1,F2 .
Proof. Assume that F ′1  F1. Consider arbitrary (z, z′) ∈ AˆF ′1→F2 . Then, by definition of
propagated assumptions, ∃s ∈ X ′1 ∩ Y2 s.t. (z, s) ∈ A′1 and (z′, s) ∈ GF ′1,F2 .
By F ′1  F1, we know that A′1 ⊆ A1 and G
′
1 ⊆ G1. Then, it follows by definition of
composite guarantees that GF ′1,F2 ⊆ GF1,F2 and so (z′, s) ∈ GF1,F2 . By (z, s) ∈ A′1 and
A′1 ⊆ A1, we have (z, s) ∈ A1. So, by definition of propagated assumptions, (z, z′) ∈ AˆF1,F2 .
So, AˆF ′1→F2 ⊆ AˆF1,F2 .
We can prove analogously that AˆF2→F ′1 ⊆ AˆF1,F2 . J
I Lemma 64. Let F , F ′ and F ′′ be interfaces, such that F ∼ F ′ and F ⊗ F ′ ∼ F ′′.
(1) If (z, z′) ∈ AˆF ′→F ′′ , then (z, z′) ∈ AˆF⊗F ′→F ′′ .
(2) If (z, z′) ∈ AˆF ′′→F ′ , then (z, z′) ∈ AˆF ′′→F⊗F ′ .
(3) If (z, z′) ∈ AˆF,F ′⊗F ′′ , then (z, z′) ∈ AˆF⊗F ′,F ′′ ∪ AˆF,F ′ .
Proof. Consider arbitrary interfaces F, F ′ and F ′′. Assume that: (a1) F ∼ F ′; and
(a2) F ⊗ F ′ ∼ F ′′.
(1) Assume that (z, z′) ∈ AˆF ′→F ′′ . By definition of propagated assumptions (def. 15), there
exists s ∈ X ′ ∩ Y ′′ s.t. (z, s) ∈ A′ and (z′, s) ∈ GF ′,F ′′ .
By (a2), s′ /∈ YF,F ′ and, by definition of composition (def. 19), (z, s) ∈ AF⊗F ′ . By
monotonicity of composite flows (lemma 61(b)), it follows that GF ′,F ′′ ⊆ GF⊗F ′,F ′′ . So,
(z′, s) ∈ GF⊗F ′,F ′′ , and by definition of propagated assumptions, (z, z′) ∈ AˆF⊗F ′→F ′′ .
(2) Assume that (z, z′) ∈ AˆF ′′→F ′ . By definition of propagated assumptions (def. 15), there
exists s ∈ X ′′ ∩ Y ′ s.t. (z, s) ∈ A′′ and (z′, s) ∈ GF ′,F ′′ . By monotonicity of composite
flows (Lemma 61(b)), it follows that GF ′,F ′′ ⊆ GF⊗F ′,F ′′ , so (z′, s) ∈ GF ′′,F⊗F ′ . Then,
by (z, s) ∈ A′′, it follows that AˆF ′′→F⊗F ′ .
(3) Assume that (z, z′) ∈ AˆF,F ′⊗F ′′ . We want to prove that (z, z′) ∈ AˆF⊗F ′,F ′′ ∪ AˆF,F ′ .
Case (z, z′) ∈ AˆF→F ′⊗F ′′ : By definition of propagated assumptions (def. 15), there
exists s ∈ X ∩ YF ′⊗F ′′ s.t. (z, s) ∈ A and (z′, s) ∈ GF,F ′⊗F ′′ . By associativity of
composite flows (Lemma 61(c)), (z′, s) ∈ GF⊗F ′,F ′′ . We proceed by cases on s ∈
YF ′⊗F ′′ .
Case s ∈ Y ′: By definition of composition, s ∈ YF⊗F ′ . By suffix property of composite
flows (Lemma 61(a)) and (z′, s) ∈ GF⊗F ′,F ′′ : (z′, s) ∈ GF⊗F ′ ∪ (GF⊗F ′,F ′′ ◦GF⊗F ′).
Consider the case that (z′, s) ∈ GF⊗F ′ . Then, by (z, s) ∈ A, it follows (z, z′) ∈ AˆF,F ′ .
Otherwise, (z′, s) ∈ (GF⊗F ′,F ′′ ◦ GF⊗F ′). Consider arbitrary (z′, s′) ∈ GF⊗F ′,F ′′
and (s′, s) ∈ GF⊗F ′ . Then, by Lemma 61(a), s′ ∈ Y ′′, and by (a2), s′ /∈ YF,F ′ .
Then, it must be the case that s′ ∈ XF,F ′ . By (s′, s) ∈ GF⊗F ′ and (z, s) ∈ A, it
follows that (z, s′) ∈ AˆF→F ′ . Then, by definition of composition and s′ ∈ XF⊗F ′ ,
(z, s′) ∈ AF⊗F ′ . Again, by definition of propagated assumptions, (z′, s′) ∈ GF⊗F ′,F ′′
and s′ ∈ XF⊗F ′ ∩ Y ′′, it follows that (z, z′) ∈ AˆF⊗F ′→F ′′ .
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Case s ∈ Y ′′: By (a2), s /∈ YF⊗F ′ . Then, by definition of composition, (z, s) ∈ AF⊗F ′ .
So, by (z′, s) ∈ GF⊗F ′,F ′′ and definition of propagated assumptions, (z, z′) ∈
AˆF⊗F ′→F ′′ .
Case (z, z′) ∈ AˆF ′⊗F ′′→F : By definition of propagated assumptions (def. 15), there
exists s ∈ XF ′⊗F ′′ ∩ Y s.t. (z, s) ∈ AF ′⊗F ′′ and (z′, s) ∈ GF ′⊗F ′′,F . By associativity
of composite flows (Lemma 61(c)) and (a1), (z′, s) ∈ GF⊗F ′,F ′′ . We proceed now by
cases on (z, s) ∈ AF ′⊗F ′′ .
Case (z, s) ∈ A′: By s ∈ Y and definition of composition, s ∈ YF,F ′ . Then, by suffix
property of composite flows (Lemma 61(a)), (z′, s) ∈ GF⊗F ′ ∪ (GF⊗F ′,F ′′ ◦ GF⊗F ′).
The rest is analogous to the case (z, z′) ∈ AˆF→F ′⊗F ′′ with s ∈ Y ′.
Case (z, s) ∈ A′′: By (z′, s) ∈ GF⊗F ′,F ′′ , then (z, z′) ∈ AˆF ′′→F⊗F ′ .
Case (z, s) ∈ AˆF ′,F ′′ : By previous lemmas 64(1) and 64(2), (z, s) ∈ AˆF⊗F ′,F ′′ . Then,
by (z′, s) ∈ GF ′⊗F ′′,F and definition of propagated assumptions, (z, z′) ∈ AˆF⊗F ′,F ′′ .
J
A.4 Proof for Proposition 24
Let F and F ′ be interfaces. F ∼ F ′ iff F ′ ∼ F , and F ⊗ F ′ = F ′ ⊗ F .
Proof. By commutativity of union and intersection of sets:
GF,F ′ = Y ∪ Y ′ = Y ′ ∪ Y = GF ′,F ;
XF,F ′ = (X ∪X ′) \ YF,F ′ = (X ′ ∪X) \ YF ′,F = XF ′,F ;
AˆF,F ′ = AˆF→F ′ ∪ AˆF ′→F = AˆF ′→F ∪ AˆF→F ′ = AˆF ′,F ;
AF,F ′ = A ∪A′ ∪ AˆF,F ′ ∩ (ZF,F ′ ×XF,F ′) =
A′ ∪ A ∪ AˆF ′,F ∩ (ZF ′,F ×XF ′,F ) = AF ′,F .
By Proposition 59, GF,F ′ = GF ′,F .
PF,F ′ = P ∪ P ′ ∪ PAF,F ′ ,GF,F ′ = P ′ ∪ P ∪ PAF ′,F ,GF ′,F = PF ′,F .
Thus, F ⊗ F ′ = F ′ ⊗ F .
Additionally, we can prove analogously that F ∼ F ′ iff ((A′ ∪A)∩ (ZF ′,F × YF ′,F )) ⊆ GF ′,F .
So, F ∼ F ′ iff F ∼ F ′. J
A.5 Proof for Theorem 23
Let F and F ′ be well-formed interfaces. If F ∼ F ′, then F ⊗ F ′ is a well-formed interface.
Proof. Consider arbitrary well-formed interfaces F and F ′. Assume that F ∼ F ′.
We start by proving that each relation in the tuple is a no-flow.
By definition of no-flow relation, we need to prove that they are all irreflexive relations. By
definition of interface and Proposition 62, AF,F ′ is an irreflexive relation. By Proposition
60, GF,F ′ is a reflexive relation, and so GF,F ′ is an irreflexive relation. Finally, by
PAF,F ′ ,GF,F ′ ⊆ GF,F ′ and definition of interface, PF,F ′ is irreflexive, as well.
We prove now that it satisfies the well-formed property:
(IdYF,F ′ ∪ AF,F ′) ◦ (GF,F ′ ◦ AF,F ′)∗ ◦ GF,F ′ ∩ PF,F ′ = ∅.
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Consider arbitrary (z, z′) ∈ (IdYF,F ′ ∪AF,F ′) ◦ (GF,F ′ ◦ AF,F ′)∗ ◦ GF,F ′ . Then, z′ ∈ YF,F ′ .
By definition of derived properties, (z, z′) /∈ PAF,F ′ ,GF,F ′ . So, we are missing to prove
that (z, z′) /∈ P ∪ P ′.
Lets consider the case that z′ ∈ Y . Then, by F ∼ F ′, z′ /∈ Y ′. Thus, (z, z′) /∈ Z ′ × Y ′
and, by definition of interface, (z, z′) /∈ P ′. Moreover, by Lemma 65 and F ∼ F ,
(z, z′) ∈ ((IdZ ∪ A) ◦ (G ◦ A)∗ ◦ G). Hence, by F being well-formed, (z, z′) /∈ P, as well.
The case for z′ ∈ Y ′ is analogous. J
In the lemmas below we prove that any alternated path in AF,F ′ and GF,F ′ from a variable
of F or F ′ to an output variable of the same interface can be translated to a path using only
the complement of that interface’s assumptions and guarantees.
I Lemma 65. Let F and F ′ be interfaces s.t. F ∼ F ′, and (z, z′) ∈ Z × Y .
If (z, z′) ∈ (IdZF,F ′ ∪AF,F ′) ◦ (GF,F ′ ◦AF,F ′)∗ ◦ GF,F ′ , then (z, z′) ∈ (IdZ ∪A) ◦ (G ◦A)∗ ◦ G.
Proof. Consider arbitrary interfaces F and F ′ and assume that F ∼ F ′. Additionally,
consider arbitrary (z, z′) ∈ Z × Y . We prove by induction that, for all n ∈ N:
if (z, z′) ∈ (IdZF,F ′ ∪ AF,F ′) ◦ (GF,F ′ ◦ AF,F ′)n ◦ GF,F ′ ,
then (z, z′) ∈ (IdZ ∪ A) ◦ (G ◦ A)n ◦ G.
Base case n = 0: It holds by Lemma 66, proved below.
Induction step: Assume by induction hypothesis (IH) that the statement holds for n.
Consider arbitrary: (z, z′) ∈ (IdZF,F ′ ∪ AF,F ′) ◦ (GF,F ′ ◦ AF,F ′)n+1 ◦ GF,F ′ . Then, by
application of the induction hypothesis: (z, z′) ∈ (IdZ ∪ A) ◦ (G ◦ A)n ◦ G ◦ AF,F ′ ◦ GF,F ′ .
Consider arbitrary (z, s) ∈ (IdZ∪A)◦(G◦A)n◦G, (s, s′) ∈ AF,F ′ and (s′, z′) ∈ GF,F ′ . Then,
(s, z′) ∈ Z×Y and, by Lemma 66, (s, z′) ∈ A◦G. Hence (z, z′) ∈ (IdZ∪A)◦(G◦A)n+1◦G. J
I Lemma 66. Let F and F ′ be interfaces s.t. F ∼ F ′. Let (z, z′) ∈ Z × Y .
(a) If (z, z′) ∈ GF,F ′ , then (z, z′) ∈ G ∪ (A ◦ G).
(b) If (z, z′) ∈ AF,F ′ ◦ GF,F ′ , then (z, z′) ∈ A ◦ G.
Proof. Consider arbitrary interfaces F and F ′. Assume that F ∼ F ′. Additionally, consider
arbitrary (z, z′) ∈ Z × Y .
(a) Assume that (z, z′) ∈ GF,F ′ . By z′ ∈ Y and Proposition 61(a), (z, z′) ∈ G ∪ (GF,F ′ ◦ G).
The case that (z, z′) ∈ G is trivial.
Consider now the case that (z, z′) ∈ (GF,F ′ ◦ G). Consider arbitrary (z, s) ∈ GF,F ′
and (s, z′) ∈ G. We know by Proposition 61(a) that s ∈ Y ′. Then, by F ∼ F ′,
(z, s) ∈ ZF,F ′ ×YF,F ′ and (z, s) ∈ GF,F ′ , it follows that (z, s) /∈ ((A∪A′)∩ZF,F ′ ×YF,F ′).
So, in particular, (z, s) /∈ A. Hence, (z, z′) ∈ A ◦ G.
(b) Assume that (z, z′) ∈ AF,F ′ ◦ GF,F ′ . By z′ ∈ Y , we proceed by cases w.r.t. Proposition
61(a).
If (z, z′) ∈ AF,F ′ ◦ G, then, there exists (z, s) ∈ AF,F ′ and (s, z′) ∈ G. As (z, s) ∈ AF,F ′ ,
then s ∈ XF,F ′ , and by (s, z′) ∈ G, s ∈ Z. Thus, by definition of variables between
interfaces, s ∈ X. By definition of composite assumptions, (z, s) /∈ AF,F ′ , and as a
consequence (z, s) /∈ A. So, (z, s) ∈ A.
If (z, z′) ∈ AF,F ′ ◦GF,F ′ ◦G, then there exists (z, s) ∈ AF,F ′ , (s, s′) ∈ GF,F ′ and (s′, z′) ∈ G.
By Proposition 61(a), we know that s′ ∈ Y ′. Additionally, by F ∼ F ′ and s′ ∈ Z, then
s′ ∈ X. Assume towards a contradiction that (z, s′) ∈ A. Then, by definition of
propagated assumptions and (s, s′) ∈ GF,F ′ , we have (z, s) ∈ AˆF,F ′ . This contradicts the
fact that (z, s) ∈ AF,F ′ . Thus, (z, s′) /∈ A and so (z, z′) ∈ A ◦ G. J
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A.6 Proof for Theorem 25
Let F, G and I be interfaces. If F ∼ G and F ⊗G ∼ I, then G ∼ I and F ∼ G⊗ I.
Proof. Consider arbitrary interfaces F, G and I. Assume that: (a1) F ∼ G; and (a2) F⊗G ∼ I.
We start by proving that G ∼ I.
From (a1), (a2) and Lemma 56, it follows that YG ∩ YI = ∅, i.e. G and I are composable.
We are missing to prove that: ((AG∪AI)∩(ZG,I×YG,I)) ⊆ GG,I . Let (z, s) ∈ XG,I×YG,I
and (z, s) ∈ AG∪AI . Note that by (a2), s /∈ YF . We want to prove that (z, s) ∈ GG,I . As
s /∈ YF and by definition of composition, if (z, s) ∈ AG, then (z, s) ∈ AF⊗G. So, it follows
that (z, s) ∈ AF⊗G ∪AI . Then, by (a2), we know that (z, s) ∈ GF⊗G,I . By monotonicity
of composite flows (Lemma 61(b)) GG,I ⊆ GF⊗G,I . Then, it follows that (z, s) ∈ GG,I .
We prove now that F ∼ G⊗ I.
From (a1), (a2) and Lemma 56, it follows that YF ∩ YG⊗I = ∅, i.e. F and G ⊗ I are
composable. We are missing to prove that: ((AF ∪AG⊗I)∩(XF,G⊗I×YF,G⊗I)) ⊆ GF,G⊗I .
Let (z, s) ∈ XF,G⊗I ×YF,G⊗I and (z, s) ∈ AF ∪AG⊗I . We prove (z, s) ∈ GF,G⊗I by cases.
Case (z, s) ∈ AF and s ∈ YG: Assume towards a contradiction that (z, s) /∈ GF,G⊗I .
So, (z, s) ∈ GF,G⊗I . By associativity of composite flows (Lemma 61 (c)), (z, s) ∈
GF⊗G,I . By definition of composition, then s ∈ YF⊗G. Thus, by (a1) and (z, s) ∈ AF ,
(?)(z, s) ∈ GF,G. Additionally, by suffix property of composite flows (Lemma 61 (a)),
(z, s) ∈ GF⊗G ∪ (GF⊗G,I ◦ GF⊗G).
If (z, s) ∈ GF⊗G, then we have a contradiction with (?).
Otherwise, there exists s′ ∈ YI s.t.: (??)(z, s′) ∈ GF⊗G,I and (s′, s) ∈ GF⊗G. By
(z, s) ∈ AF , (s′, s) ∈ GF⊗G and definition of propagated assumptions, (z, s′) ∈ AˆF,G.
So, by s′ ∈ XF⊗G and definition of composition, (z, s′) ∈ AF⊗G. As s′ ∈ XF⊗G ∩ YI
and by (a2), (z, s′) ∈ GF⊗G,I . This contradicts (??).
Hence (z, s) /∈ GF,G⊗I , i.e. (z, s) ∈ GF,G⊗I .
Case (z, s) ∈ AF and s ∈ YI : By definition of composition and (a2), (z, s) ∈ GF⊗G,I .
And by associativity of composite flows (Lemma 61(c)), (z, s) ∈ GF,G⊗I .
Case (z, s) ∈ AG⊗I :
Case (z, s) ∈ AI : By (a2), (z, s) ∈ GF⊗G,I . And by associativity of composite flows
(Lemma 61(c)), (z, s) ∈ GF,G⊗I .
Case (z, s) ∈ AG: From an analogous reasoning to the case that (z, s) ∈ AF , it
follows that (z, s) ∈ GF,G⊗I . J
A.7 Proof for Corollary 26
If F ∼ G and F ⊗G ∼ I, then (F ⊗G)⊗ I = F ⊗ (G⊗ I).
Proof. Assume that ? F ∼ G and F ⊗G ∼ I. Then, by theorem 25, it follows that: ?? G ∼ I
and F ∼ G⊗ I. By definition of composition, it is easy to prove that: (†) XF⊗G,I = XF,G⊗I ,
YF⊗G,I = YF,G⊗I , and ZF⊗G,I = ZF,G⊗I . And, by Lemma 61(c), GF⊗G,I = GF,G⊗I .
We prove now that AF⊗G,I = AF,G⊗I .
AF⊗G,I Def. 19=
(AF ∪ AG ∪ AˆF,G ∪ AI ∪ AˆF⊗G,I) ∩ (ZF⊗G,I ×XF⊗G,I) (?),(??)=
Lemma 64(3)
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(AF ∪ AG ∪ AˆF,G ∪ AI ∪ AˆF,G⊗I ∪ AˆG,I) ∩ (ZF⊗G,I ×XF⊗G,I) (?),(??)=
Lemma 64(1)−(2)
(AF ∪ AG ∪ AI ∪ AˆF,G⊗I ∪ AˆG,I) ∩ (ZF⊗G,I ×XF⊗G,I) (†)=
(AF ∪ AG ∪ AI ∪ AˆF,G⊗I ∪ AˆG,I) ∩ (ZF,G⊗I ×XF,G⊗I) Def. 19=
(AF ∪ AG⊗I ∪ AˆF,G⊗I) ∩ (ZF,G⊗I ×XF,G⊗I) Def. 19=
AF,G⊗I .
Finally, we prove that PF⊗G,I = PF,G⊗I . Note that by our previous results, it follows
that: PAF⊗G,I ,GF⊗G,I = PAF,G⊗I ,GF,G⊗I .
PF⊗G,I Def. 19=
PF⊗G ∪ GI ∪ PAF⊗G,I ,PF⊗G,I Def. 19=
PF ∪ PG ∪ PAF⊗G,PF⊗G ∪ PI ∪ PAF⊗G,I ,PF⊗G,I (?),(??)=
Lemma 57
PF ∪ PG ∪ GI ∪ PAF⊗G,I ,PF⊗G,I =
PF ∪ PG ∪ PI ∪ PAF,G⊗I ,PF,G⊗I (?),(??)=
Lemma 57
PF ∪ PG ∪ PI ∪ PAF,G⊗I ,PF,G⊗I ∪ PAG⊗I ,PG⊗I Def. 19=
PF,G⊗I . J
A.8 Proof for Theorem 31
Let F ′1, F1 and F2 be well-formed interfaces. If F ′1  F1 and F1 ∼ F2, then F ′1 ∼ F2 and
F ′1 ⊗ F2  F1 ⊗ F2.
Proof. Assume that F ′1  F1 and F1 ∼ F2. Then, by F ′1  F1: (r1) A′1 ⊆ A1; (r2) G1 ⊆ G′1;
(r3) P1 ⊆ P ′1.
We start by proving that F ′1 ∼ F2.
By (r1), (A′1 ∪ A2) ⊆ (A1 ∪ A2). By definition of composite flows and (r2), (†)GF1,F2 ⊆
GF ′1,F2 . Then, by F1 ∼ F2, we have: (A′1 ∪A2)∩ (XF1,F2 × YF1,F2) ⊆ GF ′1,F2 . So, F ′1 ∼ F2.
We prove now that F ′1 ⊗ F2  F1 ⊗ F2.
By our results above for the assumptions and guarantees composite, we are only missing
to prove that PF1⊗F2 ⊆ PF ′1⊗F2 .
Consider arbitrary (z, y) ∈ PF1⊗F2 . If (z, y) ∈ P1 ∪ P2, then, by (r3), if follows that
(z, y) ∈ P ′1 ∪ P2.
If (z, y) ∈ PAF1⊗F2 ,GF1⊗F2 , then, by definition of derived properties:
(i) (z, y) ∈ GF1⊗F2 , and
(ii) (z, y) /∈ (IdZF1,F2 ∪ AF1,F2) ◦ (GF1,F2 ◦ AF1,F2)∗ ◦ GF1,F2 .
By GF1,F2 ⊆ GF ′1,F2 , then (z, y) ∈ GF ′1,F2 , as well. We prove by induction that for all
n ∈ N and (z, y) ∈ GF1,F2 :
if (z, y) /∈ (IdZF1,F2 ∪ AF1,F2) ◦ (GF1,F2 ◦ AF1,F2)n ◦ GF1,F2
then (z, y) /∈ (IdZF ′1,F2 ∪ AF ′1,F2) ◦ (GF ′1,F2 ◦ AF ′1,F2)
n ◦ GF ′1,F2 .
Consider arbitrary (z, y) ∈ GF1,F2 .
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Base case n = 0: Note that (z, y) /∈ GF1,F2 . Assume that (z, y) /∈ (AF1,F2 ◦ GF1,F2).
Then, for all (z, s) ∈ AF1,F2 there exists (s, y) /∈ GF1,F2 . By F ′1  F1 and Lemma 63, we
have (††)AF ′1⊗F2 ⊆ AF1⊗F2 . So, it follows from (†) and (††), that for all (z, s) ∈ AF ′1,F2
there exists (s, y) ∈ GF ′1,F2 . Thus, (z, y) /∈ AF ′1,F2 ◦ GF ′1,F2 , as well.
Induction step: We assume as induction hypothesis that the statement holds for n.
Consider arbitrary: (z, y) /∈ (IdZF1,F2 ∪ AF1,F2) ◦ (GF1,F2 ◦ AF1,F2)n+1 ◦ GF1,F2 .
By induction hypothesis,
(z, y) /∈ (IdZF ′1,F2 ∪ AF ′1,F2) ◦ (GF ′1,F2 ◦ AF ′1,F2)
n ◦ GF ′1,F2 ◦ AF1,F2 ◦ GF1,F2 .
Then, for all (z, s) ∈ (IdZF ′1,F2 ∪ AF ′1,F2) ◦ (GF ′1,F2 ◦ AF ′1,F2)
n ◦ GF ′1,F2 there exists
(s, y) /∈ AF1,F2 ◦ GF1,F2 . By the same reasoning applied to the base case, it fol-
lows that for all (z, s) ∈ (IdZF ′1,F2 ∪ AF ′1,F2) ◦ (GF ′1,F2 ◦ AF ′1,F2)
n ◦ GF ′1,F2 there exists
(s, y) /∈ AF ′1,F2 ◦ GF ′1,F2 . Thus, (z, y) /∈ (IdZF ′1,F2 ∪AF ′1,F2) ◦ (GF ′1,F2 ◦ AF ′1,F2)
n+1 ◦ GF ′1,F2 .
Hence by definition of derived properties, PF1⊗F2 ⊆ PF ′1⊗F2 . And, by definition of
refinement, F ′1 ⊗ F2  F1 ⊗ F2. J
A.9 Proof for Proposition 27
Let F and F ′ be interfaces. Let f = (X,Y,M) and f ′ = (X ′, Y ′,M′) be components: If
f |= F and f ′ |= F ′, then f ⊗ f ′ |= F ⊗ F ′.
Proof. Consider arbitrary interfaces F and F ′; and components f = (X,Y,M) and f ′ =
(X ′, Y ′,M′).
Assume that (i) f |= F and (ii) f ′ |= F ′. By definition of implements, M ⊆ G and
M′ ⊆ G′. By definition of component, bothM andM′ flow relations, i.e. they are reflexive
and transitively closed. We want to prove that (M∪M′)∗ ⊆ GF⊗F ′ .
(M∪M′)∗ denesting rule= M∗ ◦ (M′ ◦M∗)∗ flows are closed for *=
(IdZ′ ∪M) ◦ (M′ ◦M)∗ ◦ (IdY ∪M′)
(i)
⊆
(ii)
(IdZ′ ∪ G) ◦ (G′ ◦ G)∗ ◦ (IdY ∪ G′) = GF⊗F ′ . J
A.10 Environments and Composition
I Definition 67. For any two components f and f ′ their composition w.r.t. a set of variables
V is defined as f ⊗V f ′ = (XF,F ′ , YF,F ′ , (M∪M′)∗ ∩ (ZF,F ′ × V)).
I Definition 68. The component with inversed roles w.r.t. component f = (X,Y,M) is
defined as f−1 = (Y,X,M).
I Proposition 69. Let F and F ′ be compatible interfaces with X∩X ′ = ∅. Let fE = (Y,X, E)
and f ′E = (Y ′, X ′, E ′) be components. If f ⊗Xf,f′ f ′ |= F ⊗ F ′ and (f ⊗Yf,f′ f ′)−1 |= F ⊗ F ′,
then fE |= F and f ′E |= F ′.
Proof. Assume that F ∼ F s.t. X ∩X = ∅ and:
(a1) f ⊗Xf,f′ f ′ |= F ⊗ F ′ and
(a2) (f ⊗Yf,f′ f ′)−1 |= F ⊗ F ′.
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Consider arbitrary (z, s) ∈ E × E ′. We want to prove that if (z, s) ∈ Z ×X or (z, s) ∈
Z ′ ×X ′, then (z, s) /∈ A or (z, s) /∈ A′, respectively. We proceed by cases.
Case s ∈ XF,F ′ : Follows directly from (a1) and definition of composite assumptions.
Case s ∈ Y : Then, by definition of interface, (z, s) /∈ Z ×X.
Assume that (z, s) ∈ Z ′ ×X ′. By (a2), X ∩X = ∅ and s′ ∈ YF,F ′ , (z, s) ∈ GF,F ′ . Then,
by definition of composition and F ∼ F ′, it follows that (z, s) /∈ A′.
Case s ∈ Y ′: Analogous.
J
We can remove the restriction that input variables of the interfaces being composed need
to be disjoint by not allowing reflexive pairs to be considered for components composition.
Then, composition would be defined as: f ⊗ f ′ = (XF,F ′ , YF,F ′ , ((M\ IdY ) ∪ (M′ \ IdY ′))∗).
A.11 Proof for Theorem 34
Let F , F ′ and F ′′ be well-formed interfaces. F uF ′ is a well-formed interface, and if F ′′  F
and F ′′  F ′, then F ′′  F u F ′.
Proof. Consider arbitrary well-formed interfaces F , F ′ and F ′′.
We prove that F u F ′ is a well-formed interface. Note that, by definition of shared re-
finement (?) GFuF ′ ⊆ G ∪ G′ and A ∪A′ ⊆ AFuF ′ Consider arbitrary (z, y) ∈ PFuF ′ .
Case (z, y) ∈ P: Assume towards a contradiction that:
(z, y) ∈ ((IdZ ∪ AFuF ′) ◦ (GFuF ′ ◦ AFuF ′)∗ ◦ GFuF ′).
We prove next the following statement about alternated paths, for all n ∈ N:
if (z, y) ∈ ((IdZ ∪ AFuF ′) ◦ (GFuF ′ ◦ AFuF ′)n ◦ GFuF ′),
then (z, y) ∈ ((IdZ ∪ A) ◦ (G ◦ A)n ◦ G).
Base case (n = 0): Assume that (z, y) ∈ GFuF ′ ∪ (AFuF ′ ◦ GFuF ′).
If (z, y) ∈ GFuF ′ , then by (?), (z, y) ∈ G.
Consider arbitrary (z, s) ∈ AFuF ′ and (s, y) ∈ GFuF ′ .
If (z, s) ∈ A, then by (?), (z, y) ∈ A ◦ G.
If (z, s) ∈ A then, by definition of shared refinement, (z, s) /∈ A′. So, by (z, y) ∈ P
and definition of propagated guarantees, (s, y) ∈ GˆF→F ′ . Thus, by definition of shared
refinement, it cannot be the case that (s, y) ∈ GFuF ′ , and so (z, y) /∈ AFuF ′ ◦ GFuF ′ .
Induction step: Assume as induction hypothesis that it holds for n. Consider
arbitrary (z, y) ∈ ((IdZ ∪ AFuF ′) ◦ (GFuF ′ ◦ AFuF ′)n+1 ◦ GFuF ′).
By induction hypothesis: (z, y) ∈ ((IdZ ∪ A) ◦ (G ◦ A)n ◦ G ◦ AFuF ′ ◦ GFuF ′). Then,
we can prove analogouly to the base case that for all (z, s) ∈ ((IdZ ∪A) ◦ (G ◦ A)n ◦ G
and (s, y) ∈ AFuF ′ ◦ GFuF ′ , we have (s, y) ∈ A ◦ G.
Hence (z, y) ∈ ((IdZ ∪A) ◦ (G ◦A)∗ ◦ G). By F being well-formed, this contradicts our
initial assumption that (z, y) ∈ P.
Case (z, y) ∈ P ′: Analogous.
We prove that F ′′  F u F ′. Consider arbitrary F ′′ s.t. F ′′  F and F ′′  F ′. Then, by
definition of refinement:
A′′ ⊆ A and A′′ ⊆ A′;
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P ⊆ P ′′ and P ′ ⊆ P ′′.
Then, A′′ ⊆ A ∩A′ and P ∪ P ′ ⊆ P ′′.
We are missing to prove that G ∪ G′ ∪ GˆF,F ′ ⊆ G′′. Assume towards a contradiction that
there exists (z, y) ∈ G ∪ G′ ∪ GˆF,F ′ s.t. (z, y) /∈ G′′.
If (z, y) ∈ G ∪ G′ then, by F ′′  F and F ′′  F ′, (z, y) ∈ G′′. This is a contradiction.
Consider the case that (z, y) ∈ GˆF→F ′ . Then, by definition of propagated guarantees,
there exists (z′, z) ∈ A, (z′, z) /∈ A′ s.t. (z′, y) ∈ P. Then, by F ′′  F , (z′, y) ∈ P ′′ and
(z′, z) /∈ A′′. So, by (z′, z) ∈ A′′ and (z, y) ∈ G′′, (z′, y) ∈ A′′ ◦ G′′. This contradicts our
assumption that F ′′ is well-formed, because (z′, y) ∈ P. We can prove analogously that
it cannot be the case that there exists (z, y) ∈ GˆF ′→F s.t. (z, y) /∈ G′′.
Hence F ′′  F u F ′. J
B Stateful Interfaces: Proofs
In what follows, F = (X,Y,Q, qˆ, δ,A,G,P) and F′ = (X ′, Y ′, Q′, qˆ′, δ′,A′,G′,P′) are stateful
interfaces, and f = (X,Y,Qf , qˆf , δf ,M) and fE = (Y,X,QE , qˆE , δE ,E) are stateful components.
B.1 Proof for Proposition 40
Let F be a well-formed interface, and f |= F and fE |= F. For all H ⊆ Qf × Q and
HE ⊆ Q×QE that witness them, respectively, then:
(i) (M(qˆf) ∪ E(qˆE))∗ ∩ P(qˆ) = ∅; and
(ii) for all q ∈ Q that are reachable from qˆ, if (qf , q) ∈ H and (q, qE) ∈ HE , then (M(qf) ∪
E(qE))∗ ∩ P(q) = ∅.
Proof. Consider arbitrary well-formed interface F, and components f and fE . Assume that:
(a1) f |= F and H ⊆ Qf ×Q witnesses it; and
(a2) fE |= F and HE ⊆ Q×QE witnesses it.
(i) By (a1) and (a2), f(qˆf) |= F(qˆ) and fE(qˆE) |= F(qˆ). Then, by Theorem 23 for stateless
interfaces and F being well-formed, it follows that (M(qˆf) ∪ E(qˆE))∗ ∩ P(qˆ) = ∅.
(ii) Consider arbitrary q ∈ Q that is reachable from qˆ. Additionally, consider arbitrary qf
and qE s.t. (qf , q) ∈ H and (q, qE) ∈ HE .
By (a1), f(qf) |= F(q) and, (a2), fE(qE) |= F(q). By F being well-formed and by q being
acessible from the initial state qˆ, then F(q) is a well-formed (stateless) interface. Hence,
by Theorem 23 for stateless interfaces, it follows that (M(qf) ∪ E(qE))∗ ∩ P(q) = ∅. J
B.2 Proof for Proposition 45
For all well-formed interfaces F1 and F2: If F1 ∼ F2, then F1⊗F2 is a well-formed interface.
Proof. Assume that F1 ∼ F2. Then, (?) F1(qˆ1) ∼ F2(qˆ2). Moreover, we know by definition
of composition that for all (q1, q2) ∈ QF,F′ we have F1(q1) ∼ F2(q2). So, it follows that for
all states (q′1, q′2) accessible by (qˆ1, qˆ2) in F1 ⊗ F2, we have F1(q′1) ∼ F2(q′2). So, by theorem
23 for stateless interfaces, (??) F1(q′1)⊗ F2(q′2) is a well-formed stateless interface. Then, by
(?) and (??), it follows that F1 ⊗ F2 is well-formed. J
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B.3 Proof for Proposition 46
For all interfaces F, G and I, if F ∼ G and (F⊗G) ∼ I, then G ∼ I and F ∼ (G⊗ I).
Proof. Consider arbitrary interfaces F, G and I. By definition of compatibility, we want to
prove that:
if F(qˆF) ∼ G(qˆG) and (F(qˆF)⊗G(qˆG)) ∼ I(qˆI)
then G(qˆG) ∼ I(qˆI) and F(qˆF) ∼ (G(qˆG)⊗ I(qˆI)).
This follows directly from theorem 25. J
B.4 Proof for Proposition 47
If f |= F and g |= G, then f ⊗ g |= F⊗G.
Proof. Assume that: (a) f |= F; and (b) g |= G. Then, there exists Hf and Hg that
witnesses (a) and (b), respectively.
Consider the relation: H = {((qf , qg), (qF, qG)) | qF ∈ Hf(qf) and qG ∈ Hg(qg)}.
Clearly, by (a) and (b), ((qˆf , qˆg), (qˆF, qˆG)) ∈ H. Then, f(qˆf) |= F(qˆF) and g(qˆg) |= G(qˆG).
So, by Proposition 27 for stateless interfaces, it follows that f(qˆf)⊗ g(qˆg) |= F(qˆF)⊗G(qˆG).
Consider arbitrary ((qf , qg), (qF, qG)) ∈ H. Then, by (a) and (b), there exists (q′f , q′F) ∈ Hf
s.t. f(q′f) |= F(q′F): and there exists (q′G, q′g) ∈ Hg s.t. f(q′g) |= F(q′G). Thus, by definition
of H, ((q′f , q′g), (q′F, q′G)) ∈ H. And, by by Proposition 27, f(q′f)⊗ g(q′g) |= F(q′F)⊗G(q′G).
Hence, H is a simulation relation for f ⊗ g |= F⊗G. J
B.5 Proof for Proposition 51
Let F1  F2. (a) If f |= F1, then f |= F2. (b) If fE |= F2, then fE |= F1.
Proof. Assume that F1  F2. Then, there exists a simulation relation H ⊆ Q1 ×Q2 that
witnesses it.
(a) Assume that f |= F1. Then, there exists a simulation relation H|= ⊆ Qf × Q1 that
witnesses it. Consider the relation H = H|= ◦H.
By Definitions 49 and 38, (qˆf , qˆ1) ∈ H|= and (qˆ1, qˆ2) ∈ H. So, (qˆf , qˆ2) ∈ H Additionally,
F1(qˆ1)  F2(qˆ2) and f(qˆf) |= F1(qˆ1). Then, by Proposition 29, f(qˆf) |= F2(qˆ2).
Consider arbitrary (qf , q2) ∈ H. By construction of H there exists (qf , q1) ∈ H|= and
(q1, q2) ∈ H. We want to prove that:
if q′f ∈ δf(qf), then there exists q′2 ∈ δ2(q2) s.t. (q′f , q′2) ∈ H and f(q′f) |= F2(q′2).
Assume that q′f ∈ δf(qf). By (qf , q1) ∈ H|=, then there exists a state q′1 ∈ δ1(q1) s.t.
(q′f , q′1) ∈ H|=. So, M(q′f) ⊆ GF1(q′1). Additionally, by (q1, q2) ∈ H and q′1 ∈ δ1(q1),
there exists q′2 ∈ δ2(q2) s.t. GF2(q′2) ⊆ GF1(q′1). Thus, (q′f , q′2) ∈ H and M(q′f) ⊆ G1(q′1) ⊆
G2(q′2). So, by definition of implements for stateless interfaces, f(q′f) |= F2(q′2).
Hence H is a witness for f |= F.
(b) Assume that fE |= F2. Then, there exists a simulation relation H|= ⊆ Q2 × QE that
witnesses it. Consider the relation H = H ◦ H|=. We can prove analogously to the
previous case that H witnesses fE |= F1. J
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B.6 Proof for Theorem 52
For all well-formed interfaces F′1, F1 and F2, if F′1  F1 and F1 ∼ F2, then F′1 ∼ F2 and
F′1 ⊗ F2  F1 ⊗ F2.
Proof. Assume that: (a) F′1  F1; and (b) F1 ∼ F2.
F′1 ∼ F2. It follows from (a) and theorem 31 for stateless interfaces.
We prove now that F′1 ⊗ F2  F1 ⊗ F2. From (a), there exists a relation H ⊆ Q′1 ×Q1
that witnesses the refinement. Consider the following simulation relation:
H = {((qF′1 , qF2), (qF1 , qF2)) | (qF′1 , qF1) ∈ H and F1(qF1) ∼ F2(qF2)}.
By (a) and (b), ((qˆF′1 , qˆF2), (qˆF1 , qˆF2)) ∈ H. Additionally, F′1(qˆF′1)  F1(qˆF1). Then, by
Theorem 31 for stateless interface, F′1(qˆF′1)⊗ F2(qˆF2)  F1(qˆF1)⊗ F2(qˆF2).
Consider arbitrary ((qF′1 , qF2), (qF1 , qF2)) ∈ H. Consider arbitrary O ∈ δYF′1⊗F2((qF′1 , qF2)).
Then, there exists G′ and P ′ s.t. O = δYF′1⊗F2((qF′1 , qF2),G
′,P ′). By H witnessing (a) and
Definition 48, there exists G ⊆ G′ and P ⊆ P ′ s.t. O′ = δYF1⊗F2((qF1 , qF2),G,P).
Consider arbitrary I ∈ δXF1⊗F2((qF1 , qF2)). Then, by H witnessing (a) and Definition 48,
there exists A s.t. I ′ = δXF1⊗F2((qF1 , qF2),A). By H witnessing (a), there exists A′ ⊆ A
s.t. I = δXF′1⊗F2((qF′1 , qF2),A
′).
Consider arbitrary ((q′F′1 , q
′
F2), (q
′
F1 , q
′
F2)) ∈ (O ∩ I) × (O′ ∩ I ′). Then, by (a) and H
definition, F′1(q′F′1)  F1(q
′
F1) and F1(q
′
F1) ∼ F2(q′F2) So, by Theorem 31 for stateless
interfaces, F′1(q′1)⊗ F2(q2)  F1(q1)⊗ F2(q2).
Hence H is a witness relation for F′1 ⊗ F2  F1 ⊗ F2. J
C Models for Theorem 55
Consider the set of traces depicted in the table 5. Clearly for both the initial time and any
time greater than 1 we have that x is independent of both y and z. 1 At time 1 we have that:
x is not independent of y, because we are missing a trace that interleaves the trace pi1
and pi2, i.e. a trace with x evaluated to 1 and y to 0 at time 1;
x is not independent of z, because we are missing a trace that interleaves the trace pi1
and pi3, i.e. a trace with x evaluated to 1 and z to 1 at time 1.
Then, the set of traces in the table 5 are not a model for the structure-aware semantics.
However, this is a model for the unstructured interpretation. This formula allows t to be a
function of both pi and pi′, unlike the structure-aware in which t can only depend on pi. Note
that the interleaving of x and y for pi1 and pi3 at time 1 is the trace pi1. Then, ft(pi1, pi2) = 1
while ft(pi1, pi3) = 2.
We verified both models using Z3 prover. We present now our encoding.
We defined data types to identify variables and traces.
(declare -datatypes () ((Var X Y Z)))
(declare -datatypes () (( Traces TR1 TR2 TR3)))
Below we show the encoding for structure-aware semantics. The other semantics are
defined by changing the position of exists ((t Int)).
1 Note that we are considering interleavings of possible outcomes at a given point in time. If there is only
one possible outcome, then two variables are vacuously independent.
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; Structure -aware Semantics
(assert (
forall ((pi1 Traces )) (
exists ((t Int)) (
forall ((pi2 Traces )) (
exists ((pi3 Traces )) (
exists ((x Bool)) (
exists ((z Bool)) (
and
(> t 0)
(
and
(= (setTraces pi1 t X) x)
(= (setTraces pi3 t X) x)
(= (setTraces pi2 t Z) z)
(= (setTraces pi3 t Z) z)
)
(
forall ((tP Int)) (
exists ((xP Bool)) (
exists ((y Bool)) (
ite (and (> tP -1) (< tP t)) (
and
(= (setTraces pi1 tP X) xP)
(= (setTraces pi3 tP X) xP)
(= (setTraces pi2 tP Y) y)
(= (setTraces pi3 tP Y) y)
) true )
))
)
(
forall ((tG Int)) (
exists ((xG Bool)) (
exists ((zG Bool)) (
ite (> tG t) (
and
(= (setTraces pi1 tG X) xG)
(= (setTraces pi3 tG X) xG)
(= (setTraces pi2 tG Z) zG)
(= (setTraces pi3 tG Z) zG)
) true ))))))))))))
The encoding for the model Tu.
; Model Tu
(define -fun setTraces ((x!0 Traces) (x!1 Int) (x!2 Var)) Bool (
ite (= x!0 TR1) (
; TR1 at time 0
ite (= x!1 0) (ite (= x!2 X) false
(ite (= x!2 Y) false (ite (= x!2 Z) false true ))) (
; TR1 at time 1
ite (= x!1 1) (ite (= x!2 X) true
(ite (= x!2 Y) true (ite (= x!2 Z) false true ))) (
; TR1 at time greater than 1
ite (= x!2 X) false (ite (= x!2 Y) false
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(ite (= x!2 Z) false true )))
)) (
ite (= x!0 TR2) (
; TR2 at time 0
ite (= x!1 0) (ite (= x!2 X) false
(ite (= x!2 Y) false (ite (= x!2 Z)false true ))) (
; TR2 at time 1
ite (= x!1 1) (ite (= x!2 X) false
(ite (= x!2 Y) false (ite (= x!2 Z) false true ))) (
; TR2 at greater than 1
ite (= x!2 X) false (ite (= x!2 Y) false
(ite (= x!2 Z) false true )))
)) (
ite (= x!0 TR3) (
; TR3 at time 0
ite (= x!1 0) (ite (= x!2 X) false
(ite (= x!2 Y) false(ite (= x!2 Z) false true ))) (
; TR3 at time 1
ite (= x!1 1) (ite (= x!2 X) false
(ite (= x!2 Y) true (ite (= x!2 Z) true true ))) (
; TR3 at greater than 1
ite (= x!2 X) false (ite (= x!2 Y) false
(ite (= x!2 Z) false true )))
)) true ))))
The encoding for the model Ta.
; Model Ta
(define -fun setTraces ((x!0 Traces) (x!1 Int) (x!2 Var)) Bool (
ite (= x!0 TR1) (
; TR1 at time 0
ite (= x!1 0) (ite (= x!2 X) false
(ite (= x!2 Y) false (ite (= x!2 Z) false true ))) (
; TR1 at time 1
ite (= x!1 1) (ite (= x!2 X) false
(ite (= x!2 Y) false (ite (= x!2 Z) true true ))) (
; TR1 at time greater than 1
ite (= x!2 X) false (ite (= x!2 Y) false
(ite (= x!2 Z) false true )))
)) (
ite (= x!0 TR2) (
; TR2 at time 0
ite (= x!1 0) (ite (= x!2 X) false
(ite (= x!2 Y) false (ite (= x!2 Z)false true ))) (
; TR2 at time 1
ite (= x!1 1) (ite (= x!2 X) true
(ite (= x!2 Y) true (ite (= x!2 Z) false true ))) (
; TR2 at greater than 1
ite (= x!2 X) false (ite (= x!2 Y) false
(ite (= x!2 Z) false true )))
)) (
ite (= x!0 TR3) (
; TR3 at time 0
ite (= x!1 0) (ite (= x!2 X) false
(ite (= x!2 Y) false(ite (= x!2 Z) false true ))) (
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; TR3 at time 1
ite (= x!1 1) (ite (= x!2 X) true
(ite (= x!2 Y) false (ite (= x!2 Z) false true ))) (
; TR3 at greater than 1
ite (= x!2 X) false (ite (= x!2 Y) false
(ite (= x!2 Z) false true )))
)) (
ite (= x!0 TR4) (ite (= x!2 X) false
(ite (= x!2 Y) false (ite (= x!2 Z) false true ))) true
)))))
